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INOTES

The United States Military Chaplaincy Program:
Another Seam in the Fabric of our Society?
The military chaplaincy' may present the ultimate confrontabetween the establishment clause and the free exercise clause of
the first amendment.3 By employing military chaplains, the government directly subsidizes religion, apparently in direct contravention
of the establishment clause. Yet, transporting military personnel to
isolated locations without providing them access to religious services
might effectively deprive soldiers of the right to practice their religion
as guaranteed by the free exercise clause. Thus, the chaplaincy promotes an "accomodation" between the two clauses, with sufficient
religion being supplied to satisfy the free exercise clause, but not so
much as to run afoul of the establishment clause's restriction against
4
excessive government aid to religion.
The precise contours of such an "accomodation," however, are
pure speculation. While the past thirty-five years have seen many
traditional areas of church-state cooperation subjected to judicial
scrutiny, 5 the constitutionality of the United States military chaplaincy program 6 has yet to be considered under traditional 7 establishtion 2

I A chaplain may be defined as "a clergyman officially attached to the army or navy, to
some public institution, or to a family or court." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 375-76 (1976).

2 One constitutional scholar has stated that "[ilt may be that more can be learned about
actual church-state affairs in America from studying military chaplains than can be seen in
almost any other area." R. DRINAN, RELIGION, THE COURTS AND PUBLIC POLICY 24 (1963).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides in relevant part: "Congress
shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion nor prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."
4 See notes 27-38 infia and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer in public schools); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemptions for religious property); Roemer v. Board of
Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (federal grants to sectarian colleges).
6 While this note deals only with government employment of chaplains in the armed
forces, somewhat similar issues are presented by employment of chaplains in various state
legislatures, in Congress, in state and federal prisons, and in veteran's hospitals and insane
asylums.
The constitutional status of legislative chaplains has only recently been decided. Historically, taxpayer actions challenging the constitutionality of compensating ministers for opening each day's legislative session had been dismissed for lack of standing. Elliot v. White, 23
F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1928); O'Hair v. Nixon, Civ. No. 410-73 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 1973) (dismissed); Murray v. Morton, 505 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1981) (action by federal taxpayers
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ment clause analysis. 8 In recent years, however, the military
chaplaincy seems more vulnerable to constitutional attack than ever
before. 9
challenging payment of salaries and certain expenses for the chaplains of the Senate and
House of Representatives dismissed because plaintiffs lacked standing and the claim
presented a nonjusticiable political question). However, in 1982, relying on Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83 (1968), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held, in Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1982), that a taxpayer (who was also a member of the
legislature) clearly had standing to challenge the Nebraska legislature's practice of compensating a chaplain to open each legislative session with a prayer and to periodically collect and
publish the prayers in book-form. The court ruled that the plaintiff had demonstrated a
sufficient "nexus" between his taxpayer status and the establishment clause claim. Id at 231.
The Court of Appeals went on to find that the Nebraska legislature's practice, taken as a
whole, was an unconstitutional violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment.
The Supreme Court disagreed, and reversed. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
The Court believed that compensation of legislative chaplains has become "part of the fabric
of our society," and is merely a "tolerable acknowledgement" of the beliefs widely held
among the people of the United States. Id. at 3336. See notes 23-26 and accompanying text
infra. Accord Colo v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 378 Mass. 550, 392 N.E.2d 1195 (1979).
Despite Marsh, the standing requirement poses a potential barrier for plaintiffs attempting to challenge the military chaplaincy program. See note 8 inZra.
The constitutional status of prison chaplains is not as clear. In Cruz V. Beto, 405 U.S. 319
(1972), the Supreme Court may have implicitly approved government funding of prison
chaplains and chapels by ignoring a challenge of the state's subsidization of religion.
Morever, the Fifth Circuit has rejected a contention that employment of chaplains in federal
prisons violates the establishment clause. This contention, said the court, "overlooks the balancing between the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses ....
" Theriault v. Silber, 547
F.2d 1279, 1280 (5th Cir.),cert. denied, 434 U.S. 871,reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977). Presumably, these programs are reasonably necessary to permit those in custody to practice their
religion.
7 As used in this Note, "traditional establishment clause analysis" refers to application
of the triparte test adopted by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 61213 (1971).
8 Very few individuals have sued to enjoin governmental expenditures for military and
other chaplaincies. Until recently, such actions have been routinely dismissed for lack of
taxpayer standing. See, e.g., Elliot v. White, 23 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1928); Hughes v. Priest,
Civ. No. 4681-55 (D.D.C.) (argument) (case dismissed Jan. 12, 1956), Appeal No. 13,293
(D.C. Cir.) (dismissed May 16, 1956). Thus, attempts to complain in court against government expenditures for chaplains have historically encountered rebuff. See Herrmann, Some
Considerations on the Constitutionality of the Military Chaplaincy, 14 AM. U.L. REv. 24, 31-32
(1964).
However, lack of standing may no longer bar taxpayer challenges of the military chaplaincy. A district court recently denied a motion to dismiss a complaint filed by two federal
taxpayers seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief against any continuation of the
United States Army's chaplaincy program. Katcoffv. Alexander, No. 79 Civ. 2986 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 21, 1980) (available Oct. 1, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file). On the issue of
standing, the court found that the plaintiffs had satisfied the requisite two-part nexus test of
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968). The court further found that the Army's extensive support of the chaplaincy program ($65,000,000 in 1980-81) was not an "incidental expenditure." Katcoff. The case is currently pending.
9 See generally Ripple, The Entanglement Test ofthe Religion Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment,
27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1195, 1235-39 (1980). See also Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C.

NOTES
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This note examines the constitutional vulnerability ,of the military chaplaincies of the United States Armed Forces.' 0 Part I considers the Supreme Court's interpretation of the first amendment
religion clauses. Part II presents the constitutional issues involved in
the chaplaincy question. Part III examines the military chaplaincy,
and Part IV applies the constitutional issues to the chaplaincy. Finally, Part V analyzes various alternatives to the present system.
I.

The First Amendment Religion Clauses:
Establishment Clause Analysis

The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting the establishment of religion nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof."" Exactly what the framers contemplated when they
penned this terse provision has been the subject of debate for over
two hundred years,' 2 and the confusion is probably every bit as great
today as it ever was.' 3 Nevertheless, in a series of decisions since
1947, the Supreme Court has made an earnest effort to apply the
basic concept of separation of church and state to a wide variety of
14
church-state relationships.
The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that the establishment clause was meant to construct an "absolute wall" between
church and state.' 5 Rather, the Court has recognized that the govCir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972) (rejecting compulsory attendance by cadets and midshipmen at Sunday chapel at the service academies.) One expert on the chaplaincy has noted
that this decision may have weakened the constitutional status of the chaplaincy as a whole.
C. ABERCROMBIE, THE MILITARY CHAPLAIN 20 n.7 (1977).
10 There are chaplains in the Army, Navy, and Air Force. See notes 46-48 infra.
11 See note 3 supra.
12 See generally J. BRADY, CONFUSION TWICE CONFOUNDED (1954).
13 As Professor Ripple notes, "the precise contours of the protection contemplated by the
framers seem to have eluded, rather systematically, [both] courts and scholars." Ripple, supra
note 9, at 1220. See also Giannella, Religious Libeq, Nonestablishment and DoctrinalDevelopment:
PartI, The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1383 (1967). For a brief history
of the background and environment of the period during which the constitutional language
was fashioned and adopted, see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1947), reh g denied
330 U.S. 855 (1947). See also Everson at 33-44 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
14 See notes 15-22 supra.
15 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). Both Jefferson and Madison advocated absolute separation of church and state. See Madison, Memorialand Remonstrance against
Religious Assessments, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183-91 (G. Hunt ed. 1901)
(reprintedin 330 U.S. at 63-72 (1947) (Rutledge, J. dissenting)). In the first of the modern cases
dealing with the religious guarantees, Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), reh'g
denied, 330 U.S. 855 (1947), the Court purported to follow this interpretation noting, "[t]hat
wall [between church and state] must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve
the slightest breach." Id. at 18. However, the Court in Everson upheld a New Jersey statute
authorizing the reimbursement to parents of bus fares of children attending both public and
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ernment can confer some benefits upon religious institutions,' 6 and
the goal of establishment clause analysis is thus to distinguish permissible from impermissible governmental interventions. The early
cases emphasized that government had to be neutral toward religion, 17 neither advancing religious causes nor inhibiting them. This
concept of neutrality led to the Court's adoption in Lemon v. Kurtzman 8 of a three-part establishment clause test. First, the governmental activity must have a secular purpose that neither advances nor
inhibits religion.19 Second, the governmental activity must have a
direct and immediate effect that is secular and neither advances nor
Catholic schools, thus evidencing an unwillingness to apply the establishment clause so literally.
The Court soon explicitly retreated from the strict separationist school, and adopted a
doctrine of accommodation rather than absolute separation. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306 (1952) (upholding a voluntary program releasing public school children for religious instruction). The Court has since warned against relying too heavily on the absolute language
of Everson. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970). The current position of the
Court is summarized in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971): "[T]he line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship."
16 Indeed, Justice Douglas has noted that our system at the federal and state level is
presently "honeycombed" with governmental financing of religious exercises. Engle v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 437 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
17 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1947), reh'g denied, 330 U.S. 855 (1947).
See P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND LAW 112 (1962). While neutrality is a central principle of
both clauses, however, there is no single standard for determining what is a religiously neutral
act; the neutrality or permissibility of a law must be examined in terms of the challenge to it.
See Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Confict, 41 U. PiTr. L.
REV. 673 (1980).
18 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). See also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977).
Although there are indications that the Court is not entirely satisfied with the three-prong
test, this test remains the standard for establishment clause analysis. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S.
Ct. 3062, 3066 (1983). However, the Court did not apply the three-prong test in Marsh v.
Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983) (upholding the constitutionality of legislative chaplains). It
is too early to speculate whether this case signals an abandonment by the Court of the triparte
test, or merely represents the Court's acknowledgment that the test is not to be applied to all
areas of church-state cooperation. See notes 25-26 infa and accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-109 (1968); School Dist. of Abington
Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
The secular purpose test requires that the government's stated purpose neither establish,
sponsor, nor support religion. Comparatively, this component is the least controversial part
of the triparte test because it is relatively easy to meet this prong of the test. See, e.g., Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). The Court gives considerable deference to any indicia of a non-religious purpose found in the statute itself or extracted from its legislative history. L. MANNING, THE LAW OF CHURCH STATE RELATIONS 18 (1980). The Court will
generally not inquire about any hidden motives which may have prompted the legislature to
exercise its power. Sozinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937).
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inhibits religion. 20 Third, the governmental activity must not pro2
duce excessive entanglement between government and religion. 1
20 See, e.g., Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222; Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 774-80 (1973).
The primary secular effect test provides that even where a statute has a secular purpose,
it violates the establishment clause when its primary effect is to financially aid, advance, or
support religion. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755-61 (1975); Nyquist,
413 U.S. at 774-80 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). Laws which aid one religion, all religion, or prefer one
religion over another are equally prohibited. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15, reh g
denied, 330 U.S. 855 (1947). Under the Court's application of this test, any supportive effect
must flow incidentally, rather than directly, from the governmental activity. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 (1981).
Where a statute with a valid secular purpose has benefitted a broad class of institutions
or individuals, including to some extent religious organizations, the Supreme Court has upheld the statute's constitutionality. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. at 274-77; Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1977); Nquist, 413 U.S. at 771. However, where a statute with a
valid secular purpose has benefitted only a limited class of primarily religious institutions or
individuals, the Supreme Court has found the statute unconstitutional on the ground that the
statute's primary effect was to advance religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624-25.
21 See Committee for Public Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 748 (1976); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678
(1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
Even if the first two parts of the triparte test are met, a statute may still be voided if it
endangers excessive governmental entanglement with religion. The first case to explicitly
articulate the excessive entanglement test was Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)
(upholding general tax exemptions for religious property). The best treatment of the test is
found in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1971). See also Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734 (1973), the only case in which entanglement was the primary basis of the decision.
The entanglement test is based on the traditional concept of a constitutional wall between church and state. Of course, an absolute wall is impossible, and government must
accommodate religion in those areas where interaction is inevitable. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
But, to a reasonable degree, disentanglement is deemed necessary to prevent the mutual corruption that has historically occurred where the affairs of church and state have become
entangled. See Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3069 (1983), Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614; Wa1z,
397 U.S. at 674-76.
The Court has identified two types of statutes that are clearly prone to excessive entanglement challenges. The first type includes statutes whose implementation requires significant administrative entanglement with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
A critical factor in determining whether a program of aid entails excessive governmental
administrative entanglement with religion is the amount of continuing government surveillance required to administer the program. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688
(1971). In examining such a statute, the Court will look at the type of institution benefitted,
the nature of the government-provided aid, and the result of the relationship between the
government and the religious authority. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
The second type of statute which is vulnerable to excessive entanglement challenge is one
which intrudes into areas fraught with actual or potential political divisiveness. Tilton, 403
U.S. at 622. See also Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973). Opponents charge that unnecessary government intrusion into certain highly charged areas has the
potential to politically polarize the public along religious lines.
A final consideration in entanglement analysis is the degree of entanglement envisioned
in viable alternatives to the present governmental practice. Even if the Court finds that a
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Obviously, the application of this test involves a great deal ofjudicial
subjectivity, and the test has met with some criticism.

2

2

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Marsh v. Chambers23 may
be an acknowledgement by the Court that the triparte test is not
sufficient to deal with certain "unique" areas of church-state relations. In Marsh, the Court refused to find unconstitutional the Nebraska State Legislature's practice of opening each legislative day
with a prayer delivered by a state-compensated chaplain. The Court
did not apply the triparte test, but rather relied on the fact that the
historical pattern of the United States, including the United States
Congress, has been to use this kind of prayer and, in light of that
history, the practice has become "part of the fabric of our society.

'24

As Justice Brennan articulated in his dissent, the majority essentially
carved an exception to the establishment clause rather than attempt
to reshape establishment clause doctrine to accommodate legislative
prayer. 25 Marsh and other recent decisions may reflect the court's
inability to devise a standard of review capable of consistent application in the resolution of establishment clause challenges, and may
indicate that Court precedent in this area can be applied only to
26
identical or near-identical fact situations.
Constitutional Issues Under Establishment Clause Analysis
Several Supreme Court Justices have expressed the view that a
chaplaincy program in the military, funded by Congress, may be
constitutionally permissible to accommodate the rights of military
personnel to the free exercise of religion. 27 Justice Brennan, concurII.

statute is entangling, it may nonetheless validate it because the present degree of entanglement is less than that of the possible alternatives. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-76
(1970).
22 See Ripple, supra note 9, at 1224.
23 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
24 Id. at 3336.
25 Id. at 3338. While it is still too early to evaluate the ultimate significance of Marsh,
one scholar has expressed the view that the Marsh majority's abandonment of the triparte test
appears to have carved out an exception to the Court's use of that standard when traditional
practices are at issue. Devins, Inconsistent Standardof Review in Last Term's Establishment Cases,
Nat'l L. J., Oct. 3, 1983, at 22, col. 4.
26 Devins, supra note 25, at 22, col. 1. Devins believes this renders court precedents of
little significance. Id.
27 This justification for the chaplaincy is a fairly recent innovation, at least when viewed
against the long history of the military chaplaincy. See notes 64-66 infra and accompanying
text. Throughout history, most all armies have been from kingdoms or nations with established churches. The notion of free exercise would have been totally foreign to them. Moreover, there is no evidence that early American chaplains were retained to secure the soldier's
right to practice religion. As Herrmann points out, the earliest recognition of the soldier's

[Vol. 59:181]

NOTES

ring in School District ofAbington Townshz' v. Schempp ,28 articulated the
basic theme, noting that provisions for chaplains might be assumed
to violate the establishment clause, yet be sustained on constitutional
grounds as necessary to secure for military personnel the rights of
worship under the free exercise clause: "Since government has deprived such persons of the opportunity to practice their faith at
places of their choice. . . government may, in order to avoid infringing the free exercise guarantees, provide substitutes where it requires
29
such persons to be."1
Justice Goldberg, concurring in the same opinion, expressed
even stronger convictions on the constitutionality of the military
chaplaincy:
Neither government nor this Court can or should ignore the signifidance of the fact that a vast portion of our people believe in and
worship God and that many of our legal, political, and personal
values derive historically from religious teachings. . . . And it
seems clear to me. . .that the Court would recognize the propriety
of providing military chaplains. .... 30
Justice Stewart contributed the famous example of the "lonely
soldier":
Spending federal funds to employ chaplains for the armed forces
might be said to violate the Establishment Clause. Yet a lonely
soldier stationed at some faraway outpost could surely complain
that a government which did not provide him the opportunity for
right to free exercise came in the 1860s, and recognition of the rights of all American soldiers
to their own chaplains developed even more slowly. See Herrmann, supra note 8, at 26.
At least one scholar has expressed the opinion that if the free exercise justification is
accepted, it logically must be extended to encompass other types of state action which endanger inhibition of free exercise rights. See R. DRINAN, RELIGION, THE COURTS, AND PUBLIC
POLIcy 25-26 (1963). Scientific expeditions to remote areas such as the South Pole might
afford one example of such state action.
A similar idea was expressed from the church's point of view in 1938: "There is no
Christian reason. . . why the army and navy should be singled out as entitled to a disproportionate share of the church's ministry, as compared with hundreds of other groups and regions which equally need the gospel and the church's care." The Chaplainty Question,
CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Dec. 21, 1938, at 1567, 1568.
28 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
29 Id. at 297-298 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
30 Id. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Goldberg further stated:
[B]oth the required and permissible accommodations between state and church
frame the relation as one free of hostility or favor and productive of religious and
political harmony, but without undue involvement of one in the concerns or practices of the other. To be sure, the judgment in each case is a delicate one, but it
must be made if we are to do loyal service as judges to the ultimate First Amendment objective of religious liberty.
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pastoral guidance was affirmatively prohibiting the free exercise of
his religion. 3 1 (emphasis in original).
32
Other justices and commentators have expressed similar opinions.
While these statements cannot be read as an official judicial approval of the chaplaincy, 33 they at least make clear that in some circumstances the need to accommodate the guarantees of the free
exercise clause within the strictures of the establishment clause might
require a displacement of traditional establishment clause analysis.
The analysis required was recently articulated in Kalcoff v.Alexander,34 a case pending in the Eastern District of New York which directly challenges the constitutionality of the Army's chaplaincy
program. The Kalcoff court, in denying the Defense Department's
motion to dismiss, acknowledged that because of the unique aspects
of military life, spending public funds for a military chaplaincy program is "justified and, indeed, perhaps even mandated. ' 35 But the
court felt that this fact alone did not ensure the constitutionality of
the present program, stating that:

In our view, we would be abdicating our judicial responsibility if
we were merely to hold that because a chaplaincy program may in
some circumstances be constitutional, the program challenged here
does, in fact, pass constitutional muster. In other words, under this
rationale a chaplaincy program is constitutional under the Establishment Clause so long as its existence is reasonably necessary to
insure that the Free Exercise rights of military personnel will not be
abridged. Where a program does not meet that end or goes beyond
that goal it's constitutional justification evaporates.
• ..[T]he complaint alleges facts which, if proven, might well establish that the chaplaincy program is so overly broad in scope as
to constitute a governmentally sponsored program of religious proselytism, and at the same time sadly inefficient in providing religious
support services to members of certain religious faiths. If these facts
were to be proven, then . . .the program would, at the least, be
31

Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

32 See, e.g., separate opinions ofJudges Bazelon, Leventhal, and MacKinnon in Anderson
v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972); Greenwood, The Constitutionality of the Militay Chaplaincy: A HistoricalStudy, CHURCH AND SOCIETY, Mar.-Apr. 1974,
at 25; J. BENNET, CHRISTIANS AND THE STATE 234 (1958). For an attack on the reasoning
,
of the Supreme Court justices, see Jonakait, Is the Militay Chaplainc Constitutional in MILITARY CHAPLAINS 129-37 (H. Cox ed. 1972).
33 Herrmann states, "[these] key statements reflect a somewhat arbitrary and less than
thoroughly considered evaluation of an essentially unresolved complex." Herrmann, supra
note 8, at 33.
34 No. 79 Civ. 2986 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1980) (available Oct. 1, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist. file).
35 Id.
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constitutionally suspect. 36

Under this approach, the court would be required to determine "how
much" religion is enough to satisfy the demands of the free exercise

clause.
While such a determination has never been made with regard to
military chaplaincies, decisions dealing with free exercise rights of
prisoners in state and federal prisons may provide some important
clues. These cases indicate that although the free exercise clause requires the government to provide at least some access to religion, this
right is not absolute. For example, prisons, like the military, often
provide, at state expense, chaplains of only the Catholic, Jewish, and
Protestant faiths. In Cruz v. Beto, 3 7 the Supreme Court ignored a
Buddhist's complaint that equal religious facilities and services were
not provided for him and members of his faith. Apparently then,

while the state is justified in providing some religious services to prisoners, it need not cater to the individual religious preference of every
prisoner. This decision might imply that the free exercise clause requires, not that the state provide absolute access to religious services,
but only that the state make a reasonable effort to provide such services. Anything beyond this reasonable effort could render the program vulnerable to charges of excessive government aid to religion, a
violation of the establishment clause.

III.

The Military Chaplaincy Program

38

Chaplains of a sort probably existed before the beginning of
recorded history.3 9 The earliest documented chaplains had two prin36 Id.
37 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
38 Any analysis of the constitutionality of the military chaplaincy must begin with an
analysis of the institution itself, for as the Kalcqff court notes, determination of the constitutionality of the chaplaincy "cannot be made in a vacuum." Katcoff v. Alexander, No. 79 Civ.
2986 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1980) (available Oct. 1, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. File).
The primary effect test will require that a court examine in detail not only the laws, rules, and
regulations which pertain to the chaplaincy, but also how the institution functions in the
field. Specifically, the court must determine how the institution of the chaplaincy affects
military personnel, the chaplains themselves, and American church-state relations in general.
This is no easy task, as the area is fraught with dispute and inhospitable to empirical study.
This note attempts only to highlight selected areas of the chaplaincy which might be of importance to a court applying the primary effect test-it makes no pretense of presenting a
thorough or exhaustive picture of the entire institution.
For a brief but excellent overview of the modern American military chaplaincy, see
United Presbyterian Report on the Militag, Chaplaincy, in CHURCH STATE AND CHAPLAINCY 25,
30-40 (A. R. Appelquist ed. 1969).
39 For a thorough treatment of the evolution of the military chaplaincy concept from its
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cipal functions. First, chaplains were responsible for interpreting divine revelation in order to predict the future. Second, chaplains were
employed to perform certain religious ceremonies that would win the
favor of God, thereby assuring victory in battle. These two concepts,
outlined in Biblical accounts, prescribed the role of the earliest military chaplains, 40 and have endured in many ways to the present day.
By the 1600's, however, the chaplain's role as a minister to men in
uniform became the dominant function of the office, 4 1 and remains
42
so today.
The American military chaplain is a member of two institutions.
First, he is a member of the military, accorded officer's rank, and
subject to the military chain of command. 43 Second, and of equal
importance, he is an ordained minister, representing one of the major
American religious denominations. 44 This "institutional duality" underlies the church-state cooperation involved in the administration of
45
the chaplaincy.
48
47
46
Chaplains work in the Army, Navy, and the Air Force.
pre-Biblical origins to its modern manifestations, see R. HONEYWELL, CHAPLAINS OF THE

(1958) (the official history of the Army chaplaincy) and C. ABERnote 9, at 31-46.
40 The first recorded instances of "men of God" functioning in what might be called a
chaplain's role are found in the Old Testament. In numerous instances, holy men accompanying the army were consulted as to the outcome of approaching battles. R. HONEYWELL,
supra note 39, at 2-3. When Moses raised up his hands during Joshua's battle with the
Amalekites, the Hebrew army was filled with the spirit of Yahweh and victory was assured.
EXODUS 11:13. Later, the function of the chaplain became more differentiated. Yahweh
directed Moses to make two silver trumpets, assuring him that if they were sounded on the
eve of battle, victory would be assured. The trumpets were to be in the hands of the Aronite
priests rather than the political or military leaders. Some years later the armies of Judah
emerged victorious against overwhelming odds after their chaplains sounded the sacred trumpets. EXODUS 17; NUMBERS 10:9, 25:13, 31:6; II CHRONICLES 13:12-20. Seegeneraly R. HONEYWELL, supra note 39, at 3-4; C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 31-32.
41 See generally J. SMYTH, IN THIS SIGN CONQUER: THE STORY OF THE ARMY CHAPLAINS (1968).
42 See notes 56-58 infra and accompanying text.
43 See United Presbyterian Report, supra note 38, at 38-39.
44 At any moment, at least 50 religious bodies contribute at least one chaplain to the
chaplaincy. Appelquist, Introduction: Chaplaincy Rationale and Support, in CHURCH STATE AND
UNITED STATES ARMY
CROMBIE, supra

CHAPLAINCY (A. R. Appelquist ed. 1969).

45 For an excellent explanation of the effect of institutional duality on the chaplaincy, see
R. HUTCHESON, THE CHURCHES AND THE CHAPLAINCY (1975). Hutcheson points out that
the chaplain is not just half-military and half-church; rather, he is a full member of both
institutions, with "one foot in heaven and the other in a combat boot." Id. at 19. Thus, the
chaplain's position is unique in both the military and the church. Id. at 17. An appreciation
of the significance of institutional duality is a key to understanding both the problems and
opportunities of the chaplaincy. Hutcheson feels that the implications of this dual set of
obligations have been given inadequate attention. Id.
46 10 U.S.C. § 3073 (1983) provides:
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Chaplain selection is based on a quota system using estimates drawn
from natural religious census data and the projected needs of the separate services.49 Based on this data, the denominations are asked to
provide the appropriate number of ministers for the chaplaincy. To
be eligible for appointment as a chaplain, a candidate must be a regularly ordained clergyman endorsed for the chaplaincy by a recognized religious denomination, and must be actively engaged in the
ministry as his principle vocation. In addition, the candidate must
meet certain educational requirements, including completion of
ninety semester credit-hours at an accredited theological school. 50
There are Chaplains in the Army. The Chaplains include(1) the Chief of Chaplains;
(2) commissioned officers of the Regular Army appointed as chaplains; and
(3) other officers 'of th6 Army appointed as chaplains in the Army."
47 10 U.S.C. § 5142(a) (1983) provides: "The Chaplain Corps is a staff corps of the Navy
and shall be organized in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the
Navy."
48 10 U.S.C. § 8067(h) (1983) provides: "Chaplain functions in the Air Force shall be
performed by commissioned officers of the Air Force who are qualified under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary and who are designated as chaplains."
49 See Zahn, Sociological Impressions of the Chaplaincy, in MILITARY CHAPLAINS 59, 65 (H.
Cox. ed. 1972).
50 The statutory requirements for appointment as a chaplain are the same as for any
commissioned officer. For appointment, a person must: (1) be a citizen of the United States;
(2) be able to complete 20 years active commissioned service before his fifty-fifth birthday; (3)
be of good moral character; (4) be physically qualified for active service; and (5) have such
other special qualifications as the Secretary of the military department concerned may prescribe by regulation. 10 U.S.C. § 532 (1983).
The criteria to determine a religious group's eligibility for the chaplaincy and the minimum educational and ecclesiastical endorsements requirements for appointment in the chaplaincy of the military services (Army, Navy, Air Force), are given in 32 C.F.R. § 65 (1983).
Section 65.4 provides in relevant part:
(a) Religious groups of the United States that seek to become ecclesiastical agencies
in order to endorse candidates for the chaplaincy must obtain recognition from the
Armed Forces Chaplains Board. As a prerequisite to receiving such recognition,
each religious group must:
(1)Have ecclesiastical authority to prepare and designate clergy for the
chaplaincy.
(2) Have enough adherents to warrant the effective use of chaplains.
(3) Provide ecclesiastical validation, support, and supervision of its chaplains.
(4) Provide chaplains who are willing to respect the integrity of and work in
cooperation with other religious groups.
(5) Abide by the regulations and policies of the Armed Forces Chaplains Board
and the Military Services.
(c) The following are the educational requirements for chaplain appointments.
The applicant shall:
(1) Possess 120 semester hours of undergraduate credits (or equivalent). ..
(2) Possess a Master of Divinity (or the equivalent theological degree) or have
completed 3 resident years of graduate-level study in theology or related sub-
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The chaplain is a commissioned officer, but his rank does not generally carry with it the authority to command troops. 5 1 He is considered for promotion within the rank structure through the same
procedures used for other officers. 52 He is obliged to follow orders
handed down by his commmanding officer, 53 and is subject to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Manualfor Courtmarlial, and all
pertinent military regulations. 54 In general practice a chaplain can
be retained on active duty55only so long as he has the endorsement of
his parent denomination.
jects that lead to ordination and ecclesiastical endorsement and that qualify the
applicant to perform professional functions as a chaplain ....
(d) Ecclesiastical endorsement of Chaplains. As a prerequisite to appointment as a
chaplain, an applicant must receive endorsement from an ecclesiastical endorsing
agency recognized by the Armed Forces Chaplains Board. . . . This endorsement
shall certify that the applicant is:
(I) A fully ordained or qualified priest, rabbi, or minister of religion;
(2) Actively engaged in a denominationally approved vocation; and
(3) Recommended as being spiritually, morally, intellectually, and emotionally
qualified to represent the applicant's religious body in the chaplaincy of the
Armed Forces.
51 10 U.S.C. § 3581 (1983), pertaining to the Army, provides: "A chaplain has rank
without command." Similar provisions are found in 10 U.S.C. § 5945 (1983) (Navy) and 10
U.S.C. § 8581 (1983) (Air Force).
52 Chaplains in all the armed forces are rated and promoted by the same procedures as
those used for the evaluation of performance and promotion of all other officers. Fitness or
efficiency reports, prepared by the commanding officer or a senior chaplain, are filed at regular intervals. Selections for promotion are made by boards of officers, including chaplains, on
the basis of the official record of fitness or efficiency reports and other official documents. R.
HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 193; United Presbyterian Report, supra note 38, at 33.
53 The organizational position of the chaplain is quite clearly defined. He is subject to
the chain of command beginning with his unit commander and is also under the supervisory
control of the chaplain of the next higher military unit. See C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at
70. With regard to the purely military aspects of his life, the chaplain is under the same duty
as any other officer to accept orders that come through the chain of command. United Presbyterian Report, supra note 38, at 33. But the chaplain is free of the control of his commanding
officer in religious matters. Id.
54 C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 70.
55 Because denominational endorsement is required by law before a chaplain can be
commissioned, it is widely assumed that withdrawal of the endorsement terminates the commission. But although this result generally follows, no statute or regulation requires revocation
of the commission under such circumstances. R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 18. See also
notes 149-52 infia and accompanying text.
However, 10 U.S.C. § 643 (1983) (concerning the discharge or retirement of chaplains
upon loss of professional qualifications) may be an attempt to resolve this situation:
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, a commissioned officer
on the active-duty list of the Army, Navy, or Air Force who is appointed or designated as a chaplain may, if he fails to maintain the qualifications needed to perform hs professional function, be discharged or, if eligible for retirement, may be
retired.
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The Army describes the duties of the chaplain as "analogous to
those performed by clergymen in civilian life,"'56 his primary mission
to provide for the religious and moral needs of the military community.57 These duties include: holding appropriate religious services
such as worship services, marriage, baptism, funerals, and prayer
breakfasts; providing religious education through religious classes, individual instruction, cultural groups, choral groups, leadership development programs, religious dance, drama, and films; and developing
pastoral relationships with members of the command through visits
with soldiers and their families, through guidance counseling, and
58
through other forms of spiritual assistance.
The churches and the military may view the role of the chaplain
somewhat differently. Civilian denominations basically agree that
the chaplain is to be a servant of God for people in uniform according to the doctrine and tradition of the denomination that ordained
him. 59 The military, however, seems less concerned with the obediIt should be noted that discharge or retirement is, according to this section, discretionary
rather than mandatory.
56
UNITED STATES, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET No. 165-2 THE CHALLENGE OF THE CHAPLAINCY IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY (1970); UNITED STATES, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION No. 165-20, paras. 2-3 (1972).
57 Few duties are actually imposed on chaplains by statute. For Army chaplains, 10
U.S.C. § 3547 (1983) provides:
(a) Each chaplain shall, when practicable, hold appropriate religious services at
least once on each Sunday for the command to which he is assigned, and shall
perform appropriate religious burial services for members of the Army who die
while'in that command.
(b) Each commanding officer shall furnish facilities, including necessary transportation, to any chaplain assigned to his command, to assist the chaplain in performing his duties.
A similar provision governs Air Force chaplains. See 10 U.S.C. § 8547 (1983). For Navy
chaplains, 10 U.S.C. § 6031 (1983) provides in relevant part:
(a) An officer in the Chaplain Corps may conduct public worship according to the
manner and forms of the church of which he is a member.
(b) The commanders of vessels and naval activities to which chaplains are attached
shall cause divine service to be performed on Sunday, whenever the weather and
other circumstances allow it to be done; and it is earnestly recommended to all
officers, seamen, and others in the naval service diligently to attend at every performance of the worship of Almighty God.
58 See Katcoffv. Alexander, No. 79 Civ. 2986 (E.D.N.Y Aug. 21, 1980) (available Oct. 1,
1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); ARMY REGULATION 165-20, supra note 56, at
paras. 2-3; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 16-5, THE CHAPLAIN (1964) [hereinafter cited as FIELD MANUAL].
59 C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 16. Some scholars point out, however, that the
ministry of a chaplain is fundamentally different than that of his pastoral colleagues, because
he works in circumstances where ordinary procedures for his being called and installed in
service are determined much less by ecclesiastical practice than by the requirements of the
military. See Williams, The Chaplaingin the Armed Forcesof the UnitedStates oAmerica in Histori-
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ence of the chaplain to the will of God than with his performance of
formal religious duties. The military views the chaplain as a "staff
specialist" who "acts as advisor and consultant to the commander in
all matters related to religion, morals, and morale as affected by religion in the command."0 Some scholars suggest that this difference
in interpretation can lead to "tension" between the demands of the
church and those of the military. 61 A number of recent studies have
addressed the question of whether the chaplain's "dual allegiance"
tends to create internal conflict or "role tension," 62 and if so, in
63
which direction that conflict is likely to be resolved.
cal and EcclesiasticalPerspective, in MILITARY CHAPLAINS 11 (H. Cox. ed. 1972). Consequently,
Williams maintains chaplains in all services come to have much more in common among
themselves than with their fellow denominationalists outside the military. Id. at 12.
60 FIELD MANUAL, supra note 58, at 1. See generaly C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 6869; R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 33-34.
61 See C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 18. The chaplain is but one of a number of
"professionals" commissioned in the military services, and the military establishment may be
likely to think of a chaplain's ordination as being comparable to a physician's licensure or a
lawyer's admission to the bar. But unlike other professions, chaplains must work for goals
established by institutions outside the armed forces and are subject to the authority of these
outside institutions. Hutcheson notes that few military commanders are deeply aware of this
difference. R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 34.
62 "Role tension" is the term used to describe situations in which the clergyman role and
the military officer role conflict. The concept is based on the assumption that one cannot
serve two masters (in this case, God and Caesar) at once. The idea is an old one. JeanJacques Rousseau, after stating that Jesus established a spiritual kingdom which separated
the religious from the political system, wrote: "A perpetual conflict of jurisdiction has resulted from this double power. . . and no one has ever succeeded in understanding whether
he was bound to obey the ruler or the priest." J.-J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND
THE DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY 138-39 (L. Crocker ed. 1762). Obviously
the military chaplain, as a servant of both the church and the state, is in danger of experiencing such conflict to an unusually high degree.
63 Most sociological research in the field of the chaplaincy has focused on role conflict.
See Aronis, A Summary of Research Literature on the MilitaO, Chaplain, 29 THE CHAPLAIN, Summer, 1973, at 2, 6-16.
The first significant research was done by Waldo W. Burchard shortly after World War
II. W. Burchard, The Role ofthe Militag Chaplain (1953) (doctoral dissertation, University of
California at Berkeley) (summarizedin Burchard, Role Conf/lcts of Militaqy Chaplains, AM. SOC.
REv., Oct., 1954, at 528-35). Burchard's study, based on questionnaires and interviews with
chaplains, concluded that chaplains resolve the conflict between their roles as clergymen and
military officers by "withdrawing into 'compartments' so that at any given time one role is
active and the other is passive." Id. at 6. Consequently, Burchard thought that the chaplain
regards himself as operating in a moral context while he is conducting tasks associated with
his clergyman role, but he is guided by other values when he is dealing with the military in
non-religious situations covered by military regulations. Burchard, Role Conficts of Mihtary
Chaplains, AM. SOc. REV., October, 1954, at 531. Both Burchard's methodology and his
findings have been criticized. See C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 105-08.
Probably the best known study of role conflict in military chaplains is G. ZAHN, THE
MILITARY CHAPLAINCY: A STUDY OF ROLE TENSION IN THE ROYAL AIR FORCE (1969).
Zahn's study, based on the responses of commissioned officers in the Royal Air Force of Great
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Throughout most of American history, the ideological relationship between organized religion and the military has been a harmonious one.6 In the United States, the belief inherited from the
Britain, began with two assumptions. First, Zahn assumed that tension is present in the role
of the military chaplain and that this tension could be demonstrated-even though the individual chaplain might be unaware of, or unprepared to acknowledge, its existence. Id. at 3132. Second, Zahn assumed that where such tension is present and recognized, the chaplain
will most likely resolve the tension in favor of the military dimension of the role. Id. Although he warns against any attempt to present the findings of his study as anything more
than an exploratory and basically descriptive survey, Zahn concludes that these propositions
were supported by the results of the study. Id. at 240-42. Zahn's study has been criticized for
being based on unproven assumptions. See C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 65.
The movement by American churches during the Vietnam War to reexamine the military chaplaincy made the role-conflict issue the subject of numerous studies. See, for example, the reports of the various religious agencies in CHURCH STATE AND CHAPLAINCY, supra
note 38, at 18-55.
The most recent sociological study of role tension in the chaplaincy is that of Abercrombie, published in 1977. See C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9. Abercrombie, while acknowledging the great potential for conflict between the clergyman and military officer roles, found
that most chaplains do not encounter situations in which God and Caesar came into direct
conflict. Id. at 99. Based on his failure to explain the variation of "militariness" among
chaplains by using military background factors, Abercrombie concluded that:
Many chaplains will tend to see military values as similar or identical to the values
they had developed as Christians and clergymen before becoming chaplains. For
these chaplains the military will not constitute a new and different moral environment requiring behavioral (thereby attitudinal) adaptions.
Id. at 123.
Other authors have further downplayed the presence of role tension in the chaplaincy.
Indeed, one study examined the high retention rate of chaplains completing their initial service, and concluded that far from being in conflict with the military life style, many religious
values are actually emphasized in the army. C. Keys, Student Research Project 86: An Evaluation of Certain Factors Affecting the Retention Rate of Career Chaplains in the United
States Army (1969) (master's thesis, Industrial College of the Armed Forces).
Perhaps the most rational view is that taken by Hutcheson. See R. HUTCHESON, supra
note 45. Hutcheson, a Navy chaplain of 30 years and an admiral, states that in a group of
persons who are simultaneously full members of two social institutions as disparate as the
church and the military, the existence of role conflict is not surprising. Indeed, he says, the
surprising thing would be its absence. But he continues:
[T]he existence of role conflict is not of itself necessarily a negative factor. The
chaplaincy is a profession which deliberately makes role conflict a way of life, and
the relevant question is not whether it exists, but how useful the results may be.
Id. at 20. Hutcheson concludes that although chaplains are undoubtedly influenced by the
military environment, they have not left the church and entered the military. Rather, Hutcheson believes the chaplain takes the institutional environment of the church with him into the
military, and a that substantial part of the perceived world in which he lives and works is
determined by church norms rather than military norms. Id. at 22. These observations are
based on Hutcheson's admittedly biased personal feelings, rather than on empirical study. Id.
at 8-9.
64 The function of the chaplain in today's military can only be understood within the
larger context of the general relationship between organized religion and the activities of the
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colonists that "service to God equals service to country" 6 5 ensured
66
enthusiastic support by the churches for the nation's war efforts.
secular state. Consequently, the development of the American chaplaincy ought to be considered in light of both historical precedents and sociological, cultural, and political forces.
The identification of the will of God with military successes in the Old Testament has
already been noted. See note 40supra. By the time of the Crusades, this concept had evolved
into the notion of the "holy war," in which not only were victories in battle perceived as a
sign of God's favor, but war was being declared tofi4'oll the will of God. Not surprisingly, the
chaplain's role in battle was often broader than mere moral or spiritual support. See R. BAINTON, CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR AND PEACE: A HISTORICAL SURVEY AND CRIT-

ICAL RE-EVALUATION 114 (1960).

But in the years following the Crusades, war came to be considered less as an expression
of God's will and more as the business of the secular government. The role of the chaplain
began to shift from exhorting the men on to victory to ministering to the men who happened
to be in the army. By 1350, the "fighting padre" had all but disappeared in England. See J.
SMYTH, supra note 41, at xvii, 4. See also C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 33.
65 The American notion of itself as a "chosen" nation had special relevance to the development of the American chaplaincy, and explains, in part, why the propriety of the chaplaincy has been questioned only rarely until recent times. Unlike his British counterpart, the
patriot chaplain of the American revolution was a "trumpet of Jehovah, proclaiming a new
crusade." C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 33. The reasons for this are both historical and
theological. The Protestant churchmen of the Revolution relied heavily on the Hebrew
Scriptures, believing them to be a guidebook for all times and places. In the Old Testament
they found increasing support for their belief not only that secular history had meaning, but
also that God realizes that meaning through the actions of a nation, of a chosen people. Id. at
35. Indeed, the revolutionaries were apparently so conscious of the relevance of the Old Testament to their difficulties that, as Honeywell states, "[m]any practices observed reverently by
American chaplains grew directly out of the usages of the primitive church and of the
prophets, priests, and judges of Israel." R. HONEYWELL, supra note 39, at 1. These practices
fixed a general pattern for later years. Id. In essence, the settlers saw themselves as a new
Israel-a chosen, covenanted nation that would serve as a model for the rest of the world.
From the start, then, a strong identification of the interests of the new nation with the interests of Christianity existed, and the notion developed that service to America, including military service, is service to God. See general/y E. TUVESON, REDEEMER NATION: THE IDEA OF
AMERICA'S MILLENNIAL ROLE (1968); S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1972).

The groundwork for a militantly patriotic American church and chaplaincy having been
laid, the chaplains of the Revolution were not only ministers of God, but were also active
patriots, stirring up support for the rebellion and the cause of independence. An early commentator on the beginnings of the American military chaplaincy illustrated the conviction
and revolutionary spirit of the chaplains of the day. In addition to being "earnest, self-denying ministers of God," many chaplains "were bold and active patriots besides, stirring up
rebellion, encouraging the weak and timid by their example as well as their teachings and
inspiring the brave and true with confidence by their heroism and lofty trust in the righteousness of the cause they indicated." J.T. HEADLEY, CHAPLAINS AND CLERGY OF THE REVOLUTION 58 (1864). See also R. HONEYWELL, supra note 39, at 35; S.AHLSTROM, supra, at 361.
66 The colonial theme of America as the vindicator of God's will on earth was much in
evidence as the nation faced later threats to its existence. The Civil War was essentially a
religious crusade against slavery, uniting the major religious traditions of the North to purge
the nation of its most despicable evil. C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 39. See generally T.
SMITH, REVIVALISM AND SOCIAL REFORM IN MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1957);

L. FILLER, THE CRUSADE AGAINST SLAVERY, 1830-1860 (1960); E. TUVESON, supra note 65,
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Consequently, the propriety of the military's use of chaplains to fur67
ther the war effort was, until recently, rarely questioned.
68
Vietnam brought with it a changed perspective. Scholars genat 162-63. But see Williams, supra note 59, at 33 (viewing the civil war as a "just war" but not
a "crusade"). The Spanish American War was viewed by many as an unselfish effort to
liberate the oppressed people of Cuba, and many church leaders wholeheartedly supported
the effort. R. HONEYWELL, supra note 39, at 158. Honeywell comments that "many devout
people saw the hand of Providence in the incidents of battle." Id. One participant wrote:
"[F]ew came out of this campaign, we venture to believe, without firm conviction that had
not God been on our side, the enemy would have swallowed us." Id. Set also C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 40.
Church support for the American efforts in World War I was similarly strong and vigorous. Id. According to Ahlstrom, one noted Utilitarian exclaimed that he felt Christ himself
"would take a bayonet and grenade and bomb and rifle and do the work of deadliness against
that which is the most deadly enemy of his Father's Kingdom in a thousand years." S. AHLSTROM, supra note 65, at 885; ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9 at 40.
The Cold War lacked the violence of previous conflicts, but the role of religion was no
less central. The reaction to the threat of the atheistic communists was severe; one historian
has noted that many people in the United States came "to regard the Soviet Union almost as
the Anti-Christ" and that anti-communism emerged in the United States "virtually as a secular religion." A. THEOHARIS, THE YALTA MYTHS: AN ISSUE IN U.S. POLITICS 1945-1955 72

(1970). Ahlstrom commented that "[b]eing a church member and speaking favorably of religion became a means of affirming the 'American way of life', especially since the USSR and
its communist allies were formally committed to atheism." S. AHLSTROM, supra note 65, at
951-52. Thus, viewing the communist movement as a threat to Christianity, the churches
rallied to the ideological defense of the free world. C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 41-42.
Such sentiments were additionally evident during the Vietnam War. As late as 1966, Cardinal Spellman told soldiers in Vietnam that they were "fighting for Christ." Williams, supra
note 59, at 53.
Based on this history, Abercrombie concludes that until very recently, most of the American churches have often supported United States military policy as the will of God. C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 42. Consequently, he believes American chaplains were able to
serve two masters without tension, since both masters appeared to want much the same thing.
Id. at 137.
Vietnam may have ended this harmonious partnership. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
67 Since colonial times, however, the chaplain's constitutional status has occasionally been
called into question. See notes 75-78 infla and accompanying text. See generaly Kug, The
Chaplaincy in American Public Lif, in CHURCH STATE AND CHAPLAINCY 70-83 (R. Appelquist
ed. 1969).
68 See Fernandez,Forward, in MILITARY CHAPLAINS iii-iv (H. Cox ed. 1972). In explaining why he decided to edit MILITARY CHAPLAINS when he did, Harvey G. Cox, Jr. explained:
'Now' , means Vietnam. Our whole nation is now reeling under the traumatizing
and unprecedented experience of discovering how wrong we have been and for how
long we have been wrong about our war in Southeast Asia. . . . Our bitter experiences in Vietnam and Indochina have provoked the beginnings of a searching reevaluation of all our national institutions. . . . It is only natural that this shocked
reappraisal should also include another hard look at the military establishment and
the religious community, and at that crucial point where these two intersect is the
institution of the military chaplaincy.
Cox, Introduction: The Man of God and the Man of War, in MILITARY CHAPLAINS vi (H. Cox. ed
1972) (emphasis in original).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[19831

erally agree that the Vietnam experience sparked a general reappraisal of America's moral and religious traditions regarding the
activities of the secular government. 69 American society began to
question whether America's participation in the war was justified,
and serious doubt was expressed whether organized religion had any
business legitimizing the unpopular and unjust war.70 Chaplains,
sometimes referred to as "greased cogs in a machine for killing" 7 1
because of their role in the military, came under particularly harsh
criticism. 72 The chaplain's role as a military officer was considered
by many churchmen to be incompatible with the clergy role, necessi73
tating elimination of the chaplaincy.
69 See S. AHLSTROM, supra note 65, at 1085; C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 127-28.
70 A good discussion of these concerns is found in Zahn, supra note 49, at 77-80. Zahn
concedes that the "essentially parochial" activities of the chaplain are unlikely to produce
serious tension. Id at 77. But other dimensions of the chaplain's role-the provision of guidance, the obligation to set a moral tone, the duty to advise commanders on religious, moral,
and morale matters--present potential problems. Id at 78. Zahn also concedes that the
adverse stereotype of the chaplain as a tool of the military ("a blesser of cannons") is probably
a thing of the past. Id But he feels that dramatic and possibly controversial ceremonial
occasions or spiritual endorsements of this type are much less of a problem than the more
subtle day-by-day endorsement the chaplain may be giving the military establishment and its
practices merely by being present. Id He states:
Although to the best of my knowledge there has been no research which will settle
this particular issue one way or the other, it would be inconsistent with all that is
known about the power of symbolic communication if the sight of a clergyman
wearing the uniform and holding officer's rank did not become, at the very least, a
symbol of the military's acceptability in the eyes of the church he represents. One
may debate whether the chaplain's presence is taken as evidence of the church's
direct blessing, but that is largely beside the point (emphasis in original).
Id.
Zahn further expresses his belief that eventually, the chaplaincy and the churches will
have to face the question of whether the "spiritual welfare of the men" might not require a
complete and open dissociation from war and the fighting of wars:
If clergymen, once they have put on the uniform and rank of the military establishment, have nothing to say [about the immoral practices and policies of the military]
• . .it is possible that their example might serve to quiet and dull the moral sensitivities of their charges, and, by so doing, work to their spiritual detriment.
Id. at 85. In short, Zahn feels the chaplaincy may have reached the point where it constitutes
a source of scandal in the strict theological sense. Id.
71 R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 62.
72 See Klitgaard, OnwardChristianSoldiers.- Dehumanization and the Military Chaplain, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Nov. 18, 1970, at 1377-80.
73 Supported by resurgent pacifism and anti-military feeling, a serious debate emerged in
church circles over the advisability of the chaplaincy. "Clergy and Laity Concerned about
Vietnam" published MILITARY CHAPLAINS, note 32 supra, a collection of essays that was
highly critical of the modern chaplaincy. In addition, many denominational task forces issued reports in the early seventies that called for changes in, or demilitarization of, the chaplaincy; see, for example, United Church Task Force, Mimsteries to Military Personnel 82-91
(1973) (report to the Ninth General Synod, St. Louis, Missouri).
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The voices Of criticism have quieted in recent years; but the experience raises serious doubts whether the churches can ever again
ally themselves so comfortably with the ideology of the military. The
chaplain's resulting predicament is vividly described in a recent
study of the chaplaincy: "The day will come, I feel, when the contrast.

. .

between the American military ethic and the American ci-

vilian ethic will be nowhere greater than in the field of religion. And
the chaplain will be left, straddling the gap that has become a
74
chasm!"
IV.

Constitutional Status of the Military Chaplaincy

The debate over the constitutionality of the military chaplaincy
is not new. James Madison opposed every form of government-supported chaplaincy, 75 and a strong anti-chaplain movement surfaced
74 C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 137.
75 Madison opposed every form and degree of official relation between clergy and civil
authority. For him, religion was a wholly private matter beyond the scope of civil power
either to restrain or to support. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. -1, 39-40 (Rutledge,
J., dissenting), reh g denied, 330 U.S. 885 (1947). Accordingly, Madison opposed government
sponsorship of chaplains in every area, including the army and navy. Although he recognized
that the state might have a legitimate interest in seeing that the morale of its troops was
maintained, he could not reconcile this admittedly valid interest with his beliefs in religious
liberty. In his Detached Memoranda, he set forth his arguments against the chaplaincy:
Better also to disarm in the same way, the precedent of Chaplainships for the army
and navy, than erect them into a political authority in matters of religion. The
object of this establishment is seducing; the motive too is laudable. But is it not
safer to adhere to a right principle, and trust to its consequences, than confide in
the reasoning, however specious in favor of a wrong one. Look thro' the armies and
navies'of the world, and say whether in the appointment of ministers of religion, the
spiritual interest of the flocks or the temporal interest of the Shepherds be most in
view; whether here, as elsewhere the political care of religion is not a nominal more
than a real aid.
Fleet, Madison's "DetachedMemoranda," III WM. & MARY Q. 558 (1946). Madison recognized
the possibility that the restricted freedom of movement of military personnel might require
the appointment of chaplains to prevent an infringement on the free exercise of religion,
especially in the case of "navies with their insulated crews." Id. However, he concluded that
even in these situations the "right principle" precluded the use of government-supported
chaplains. See generaly C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY, & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL
ESTABLISHMENT 178-82 (1964) [hereinafter cited as C. ANTIEAU]; L. PFEFFER, CHURCH
STATE AND FREEDOM 250-52 (rev. ed. 1967); Herrmann, supra note 8, at 26-27.
Madison was not alone in his opposition to the use of chaplains during this period. Antieau quotes an unsigned article in the Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser for
December 24, 1789, which asserted:
The moment that a minister is so fixed by law as to obtain a legal claim on the
treasury for religious services, that moment he becomes a minister of the state and
ceases to be a gospel ambassador. This is the very principle of religious establishment and should be exploded forever.
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in the last half of the 19th century. 76 For a number of reasons, 77
however, the debate has been especially heated in the years since
Vietnam.78
C. ANTIEAU, supra, at 181. On the whole, however, the American community was overwhelmingly supportive of chaplains in a variety of situations. Id.
76 A strong anti-chaplain movement arose in the period between the war with Mexico
and the outbreak of the Civil War (1848-1861). Various Protestants, particularly Predestinarian Baptists, launched strong attacks against government chaplaincies, invoking article VI of
the Constitution as well as the first amendment. These "memorials" petitioned that the office
of chaplain be abolished not only in the army and navy and their academies, but also in
Congress and in relations with Indian tribes. Hard-shell Baptists recommended that military
personnel support their own clergymen if they desired religious services. Moreover, they objected to the chaplain's officer rank, and suggested that chaplains join the services as common
enlisted men. See generally Klug, supra note 67, at 74-79.
In response to this widespread criticism of federal chaplaincies, the Judiciary Committees of both houses of Congress considered the issue, and issued reports which concluded that
neither the letter nor the spirit of the first amendment was violated by the chaplaincies. Instead, the reports advocated the government's continuance in providing religious facilities for
those citizens who were serving their country. H.R. REP. No. 583, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1849); S. REP. No. 376, 32nd Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1853); H.R. REP. No. 124, 33d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1854). The reports stressed the view that Christianity should be encouraged, and that
to abolish the military chaplaincy "would seem like retrograding rather than advancing civilization." H.R. REP. No. 583, supra. A major publication which sustained Congress's pro-

chaplaincy stance during this period was JOHNSON,

CHAPLAINS OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT WITH OBJECTIONS TO THEIR EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERED 14-21 (1856), which empha-

sized the country's status as a "Christian nation." See generally 1 C.M. DRURY, THE HISTORY
OF THE CHAPLAINS CORPS UNITED STATES NAVY 1788-1949 64 (1950); Klug, supra note 67,
at 74-79; Williams, supra note 59, at 30-32; Herrmann, supra note 8, at 27-29.
Toward the third quarter of the 19th century, a number of liberal religious groups, such
as the National Liberal League, vigorously pursued their conception of true church-state separation, which included advocating the abolition of all state-paid chaplaincies. Herrmann,
supra note 8, at 29.
The period between the two world wars also presented difficulties for the military chaplaincy. The drastic demobilization of the armed forces, the movement toward pacificism in
some American churches, and the criticism of incumbent chaplains for their lack of spirituality almost ended the chaplaincy. See Klug, supra note 67, at 80.
In 1950, President Harry Truman appointed a committee to study the chaplaincy pro-

gram, and their report was supportive of the program.

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON

RELIGION AND WELFARE IN THE ARMED FORCES, REPORT ON THE MILITARY CHAPLAINCY

(1950).
77 Some scholars have expressed the opinion that many traditional areas of civil-religious
cooperation, such as the military chaplaincy, may be exposed to new attack. See Ripple, supra
note 9, at 1237, 1239. Abercrombie feels that the decision in Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972), which rejected compulsory attendance by cadets
and midshipmen at Sunday chapel at the service academies, may have weakened the constitutional status of the chaplaincy. C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 20 n.7. Katcoff v. Alexander, No. 79 Civ. 2986 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1980) (available Oct. 1, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist. file), indicates that such views are not unfounded.
78 See notes 68-73 supra. Many of the denominational task force reports and other publications came to the conclusion that the present military chaplaincy program violates the first
amendment. See, e.g., Jonakait, Is the Militag Chaplaincy Constitutional?, in MILITARY CHAPLAINS 129-37 (H. Cox. ed. 1972); R. Jonakait, The Abuses of the Military Chaplaincy (May
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Several approaches might be utilized by a court to determine
the constitutionality of the military chaplaincy program. First, a
court could apply traditional establishment clause analysis and the
triparte test to the military chaplaincy and those areas of the program that are constitutionally suspect. Second, a court could focus
on two unique characteristics of the military chaplaincy, its relationship to national defense and its long history of acceptance as a part of
American life. These two characteristics might lead a court to find
the program constitutional despite the fact that it might79otherwise
fail the triparte test and violate the establishment clause.
A.

The Trarte Test Applied to the Militay Chaplaincy

1. The Secular Purpose Test
The government has historically encountered little difficulty in
establishing a secular legislative purpose behind legislation which directly or indirectly benefits religion.8 0 Similarly, a secular purpose
for the military chaplaincy is easily established. The government
views the chaplaincy program as a necessary element in the provision
of the welfare needs of the troops. The commander of a military
unit, it is argued, has the final responsibility for the welfare of the
men in his unit. All human beings need food, shelter, and the other
physical necessities. In addition, human beings also have other needs
1973) (mimeographed report, American Civil Liberties Union); United Church Task Force,
Ministeriesto Militay Personnel 11 (1973) (report to the Ninth General Synod, St. Louis, Missouri).
On the other hand, a study of the judicial status of the military chaplaincy in 1974
concluded that the chaplaincy was both constitutional and necessary. Greenwood, The Constitutionality of the Militagy Chaplainty: A Hitorical Study, CHURCH AND SocIETY, Mar.-Apr.,
1974, at 25.
79 In Committee for Public Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980), Justice White,
writing for the majority, indicated that the Court does not necessarily view the triparte test as
the final or definitive tool of establishment clause analysis. White noted that by avoiding
categorical imperatives and absolutist approaches, the Court's decisions have sacrificed clarity
and predictability for flexibility. This sacrifice will endure "until the continuing interaction
between the courts and the states. . . produces a single, more encompassing construction of
the Establishment Clause." Id. at 662. Some scholars have interpreted such statements to
indicate that the Court may be planning a reassessment of the triparte test. See, e.g., Ripple,
supra note 9, at 1196. Whether Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983), represents such a
reassessment remains unclear. If so, the result in Marsh may have been forseen by the Katcof
court when it stated with regard to the military chaplaincy that "[i]t is clear that in some
circumstances the need to accommodate the strictures of the Establishment Clause with the
guarantees of the Free Exercise Clause might require a displacement of the traditional Establishment Clause analysis." Katcoff v. Alexander, No. 79 Civ. 2986 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1982)
(available Oct. 1, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
80 See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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that transcend those physical necessities. One such need, at least for
a large number of troops, is religion. Thus, the commander also has
responsibility for the religious life of the men in his unit. Since the
commander himself lacks the training necessary to understand the
religious needs of all his men, he appoints the chaplain as a "staff
specialist" to assist him in this phase of his responsibility.8 This
stated purpose should be sufficient to satisfy the secular purpose test.
Judicial acceptance of this argument, however, might not be automatic. In Schempp ,82 the Supreme Court dealt with the reading,
without comment, of Bible verses at the beginning of each public
school day. The School District argued that the exercises were for
the secular educational purposes of inculcating moral and spiritual
values in the school children and establishing discipline in the classroom.

3

However, the court found that the exercises were intended

by the state to be a religious exercise, and thus in violation of the
establishment clause.8 4 With respect to the inculcation of moral and
spiritual values, Justice Brennan stated in his concurring opinion:
To the extent that only religious materials will serve this purpose, it

seems to me that the purpose as well as the means is so plainly
religious that the exercise is necessarily forbidden by the Establishment Clause. The fact that purely secular beliefs may eventually
result does not seem to me to justify the exercises. ....
original) .85

(emphasis in

As for the secular purpose of fostering a more disciplined classroom
atmosphere, Brennan stated that "[t]o the extent that such benefits
result not from the content of the readings and recitation, but simply
from the holding of such a solemn exercise . . . it would seem that

8' 6
less sensitive materials might equally serve the same purpose.
A school situation can of course be distinguished from that of a
chaplain.8 7 But the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Anderson
81 See C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 17-18. See also R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at
62.
82 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
83 Id. at 278-79 (Brennan, J., concurring).
84 Id. at 223.
85 Id. at 280. Brennan also stated that "government may not employ religious means to
serve secular interests, however legitimate they may be, at least without the clearest demonstration that nonreligious means will not suffice." Id. at 265.
86 Id. at 280.
87 Brennan distinguished the activities and practices of chaplains from the sponsorship of
daily Bible reading and prayer recital, stating that the situation of the school child is "plainly
unlike" that of the isolated soldier. Id. at 299. In Marsh, the Court also distinguished the
chaplain situation from that of prayer and Bible reading in public schools, stating that
"[hlere, the individual claiming injury by the practice is an adult, presumably not readily
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v. Laird,88 using reasoning analagous to that in Schempp, ruled that
compulsory church attendancein military academies was unconstitutional. The court issued this ruling despite the argument of senior
Naval authorities that the divine services conducted at the Naval
Academy chapel were "entirely secular in purpose," and provided
solely as an element in the training of young midshipmen to become
officers and gentlemen.8 9 Applied to the chaplaincy, this reasoning
suggests that for the government to demonstrate a secular legislative
purpose, it would have to prove that alternative systems of providing
for the psychological and spiritual welfare of the troops, such as lay
guidance counselors or a privately funded civilian chaplaincy, would
not achieve the secular purpose of providing for the general spiritual
welfare of the troops. 90
2.

The Primary Secular Effect Test

The establishment clause prohibits statutes which aid religion in
general and which prefer one religion over another. 9' The military
chaplaincy, it is argued, does both.
First, opponents of the chaplaincy allege that by design and appearance the United States lends its prestige, influence, and power to
organized religion by granting commissions, rank, and uniform to
chaplains. 92 In response, the government's position is that the military is simply supplying religious services to those denominational
members who wish to participate in them, and that the existence of
the Chaplain's Corps need not even imply an official position about
the existence of God. 93 While this response is probably sufficient to
satisfy the secular purpose test, analysis of the military chaplaincy
indicates that the government is indeed promoting organized religion
to a considerable degree, thus failing the secular effect test.
Central to this analysis is the concept of "civil religion. '94 In the
susceptible to 'religious indoctrination'.
or peer pressure ...
" Marsh v. Chambers, 103
S. Ct. 3330, 3335-36 (1983).
88 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
89 Id at 294, 300 n.5. See also R. HUTCHENSON, supra note 45, at 9, 134.
90 Toward this end, one author asks: "The armed forces have secular recreation officers;
why not secular morale offices or secular counselors? What is it precisely that requires a
shaman with ties and obligations and military rank conferred by the army, navy, or marine
corps?" Miller, Chaplainy vs. Mission in a Secular Age, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Nov. 2, 1966, at
1335-36.
91 See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
92 Katcoff v. Alexander, No. 79 Civ. 2986 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1980) (available Oct. 1,
1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
93 C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 18.
94 Rousseau first coined the phrase in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 62. See R.
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broadest sense, civil religion refers to any modification of the pure
teachings of the denominations by the socio-political environment.
Most controversy, however, has focused on the substantive effect of
patriotic and naturalistic sentiments on such teachings. The label
"civil religion" has been applied to at least three different phenonema present in the American experience. 95 The first, and most
widely accepted, 9 6 definition of civil religion is that given by Robert
Bellah, 97 who describes it as merely an expression of religious faith
interpreted in light of American historical experience. In essence,
such civil religion consists of the natural consequences of the "Godcentered dimension" of American national life. 98 This manifestation
of civil religion poses few problems for the military chaplain. However, the two other manifestations of civil religion, "common denominator" religion and "American way of life" religion, do present
serious problems for the chaplain.
Common denominator religion is a danger in any system, such
as the chaplaincy, which is based on cooperative religious pluralism. 99 Pluralism is an essential feature of the chaplaincy, since in
many situations, such as on a ship at sea, chaplains representing the
denominations of all the troops will not be available. Therefore,
each chaplain is obligated not only to serve those of his own faith or
HUTCHESON, supra note 95, at 131. Only recently, however, has civil religion been clearly
identified and discussed as a religious dynamic in the United States. See Bellah, Civil Relgion
in America, DAEDALUS. Winter, 1967, at 1-21.

95 See generalgy R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 129-43. Hutcheson notes that failure to
differentiate between the three kinds can lead to considerable confusion. Id at 137.
96 Id. at 141.
97 See note 94 supra.
98 Bellah's form of civil religion recognized the "God-centered dimension of national
life" as revealed by American history. Bellah, supra note 94, at 12. Rather than replacing or
opposing denominational religions, civil religion coexists with them as an additional aspect of
a valid religious experience. Id. Civil religion is characterized by a general recognition that
God is a central Symbol and God's sovereignty has safeguarded the nation from absolutism.
Id It recognizes a deep obligation to carry out God's will on earth, and emphasizes the theme
that sacrifice for the nation is, in a sense, sacrifice for God. Bellah felt that this civil religion
makes a significant contribution to the American tradition, and Hutcheson feels that this is
an authentic religious expression in which chaplains may legitimately participate. R.
HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 141.

99 Pluralism may be defined as "[a] state or condition of society in which members of
diverse ethnic, racial, religious, or social groups maintain an autonomous participation in and
development of their traditional culture or special interest within the confines of a common
civilization."

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1745 (1976).

The pattern of cooperative pluralism currently practiced in the military chaplaincy is
based on the principle that "the American religious climate is properly one of mutual respect,
understanding, and cooperative co-existence between adherents of different religions." R.
HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 117.
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denominational group, but also to make provision for those of other
faiths and groups. One way to accommodate all troops is to adjust
his services to serve the needs of his inter-denominational congregations.' 00 Alternatively, the chaplain may provide for the exchange of
services among chaplains, the services of civilian clergymen, or use of
lay leaders.' 0 ' Another consequence of this religious pluralism is the
use of educational materials which stress the common beliefs shared
by most denominations.

02

While such accommodations may be unavoidable, many writers
feel that the chaplaincy, by practicing "practical ecumenicism", effectively creates a "common denominator religion,"' 0 3 in which the
individual identities of the denominations are lost.

04

It has been al-

leged that the Army and Navy become "denominations" for the
chaplains of the respective services, supplanting civilian ecclesiastical
bodies.' 0 5 Thus, it might be argued that the primary effect of the
government's sponsorship of the chaplaincy is to "establish" a religion. Supporters of the chaplaincy vigorously deny these
allegations. 106
100 R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 118.
101 Id at 118-19.
102 Id at 154 ("Character Education" lectures on religion).
103 "Common denominator religion" consists of those beliefs and symbols which are held
in common by most people. Its roots may be traced to the 1930s, when John Dewey proposed
the elimination of all uncommon and exclusive elements in denominational religion and the
replacement of denominational religion with a new "common faith" of Americans. J.
DEWEY, A COMMON FAITH (1934). Most contemporary common denominator approaches
seek to combine rather than discard particularized religions, focusing on the common elements in the Judeo-Christian family. Common denominator religion is an element in all
forms of civil religion, and is generally objectionable only when it seeks to stand on its own or
become a substitute for denominational religion.
104 R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 128. Denominational officials have criticized the
chaplaincy on these grounds. Id at 129. Justice Brennan has commented that the concept of
a "common core" theology is offensive to many. School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 286-87 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (commenting on the suggestion of fashioning school prayers that were tolerable to all creeds but preferential to none).
105 Williams, supra note 59, at 12-13, 32. Williams states that the ministry of a chaplain is
fundamentally different from that of his pastoral colleagues because "he works in circumstances such that the ordinary procedures for his being called and installed in service are
determined much less by ecclesiastical practice than by the requirements of the specialized
group and institution in which he serves." Id at 11. Thus, he concludes, chaplains in the
service often come to have much more in common among themselves than with their fellow
denominalists outside the military, and "it is only natural that the 'distinctive polity' of armadas and armies should create, as it were, two new 'denominations,' namely, the Army and
Navy chaplaincies." Id at 12.
106 Supporters of the chaplaincy argue that the chaplaincy makes a clearcut distinction
between the administrative area, in which the chaplain functions without regard to his denominational affiliation, and the religious area, in which he functions entirely as a representa-
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The "American way of life" religion is based on the idea that
the pure teachings of the denominations become modified by patriotic and nationalistic sentiments, 0 7 resulting in an "operative natural religion"' 10 8 which tends to equate service to God with service to
country. 0 9 Obviously, the military situation is especially conducive
to the development of such sentiments, and it has been observed that
no one comes closer to civil religion in all its manifestations than the
tive of his own church. R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 119. Hutcheson notes that this
principle is summed in the motto of the Navy Chaplains Corps: "Cooperation without Compromise." Id
Moreover, supporters point out that it is not true, as is widely assumed, that chaplains
conduct general Protestant services that conform to a common normative pattern. Rather,
every chaplain is entirely free to follow the liturgy and forms of his own denomination, with
such adjustments as his denomination may permit (and he may care to make) to the fact that
worshipers come from many denominations. Such adjustments are by no means mandatory.
Id at 120-21.
Establishing a lack of coercion by the military to adjust denominational Protestant services to become generalized is probably insufficient to answer the accusation of common denominater religion. The fact remains that most chaplains of Protestant denominations do
make such adjustments. Id at 120. Even Hutcheson admits that the effect of cooperative
pluralism on religious faith, while promoting a decrease in "petty sectarianism" and contributing to the ecumenical movement, also "may lead to a weakening of those aspects of Christian witness which might be controversial (but may nevertheless be regarded by some as
central) and a blurring of focus." Id at 128.
107 See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
108 "American way of life" religion is described by Will Herberg. W. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY (rev. ed. 1960).
Herberg identified the things to which Americans were obviously devoted, as evidenced by
their operative choices, and postulated that this core of common values constituted the operative national religion. Id. at 75. Serious problems are undoubtedly presented when the
"American way of life" is elevated to the status of a religion in substitution for more authentic
forms. In such situations religion might be used for nationalistic purposes, since God's will is
identified with the national will. In essence, God becomes a means rather than an end. See
R. HUTCHESON, SUpra note 45, at 141. Such fears were at the root of the anti-chaplain movement following the Vietnam war, and this aspect of civil religion presents the most problems
in regard to the chaplaincy. Id
Abercrombie concluded, however, that such fears were probably unfounded. His studies
indicated that the chaplain corps has remained "remarkably faithful" to the original source
ofits religious attitudes, even within the sometimes contradictory military environment. Furthermore, he noted (with optimism) that civilian clergymen, and indeed, the American
churches in general, seem to be increasingly less willing to accept a nationalistic definition of
Christianity. C. ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 135.
109 Williams describes the phenomenon as follows:
[T]he religious pluralism of the original republic and the religious fervor connected
with almost all American wars.. . have together as in some titanic geological process abraded the jagged contours of sectarianism and religious regionalism to create
a rather polished religion of the republic, or civil religion or common-denominator
religion, a "civil ecumenity" shaped by the forces of national destiny.
Williams, supra note 59, at 14.
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military chaplain. II0 Indeed, it has been posited that chaplains are
in actuality communicating a "military religion" which legitimizes
military authority, justifies participation in war, and seeks to further
the concept of the wholesome soldier.",
Many activities of the chaplain can be viewed as bringing the
chaplain face to face with civil religion. For example, he is almost
always expected to be a participant on ceremonial occasions.'

12

Civil

religion also manifests itself in the various character guidance, moral
leadership, and human goals programs., 13 It is difficult if not impos110

R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 133. Hutcheson states of the chaplain:
As a member of an institution which exists to serve a national purpose and which is
a major focal point for much of the nation's patriotic sentiment, he is no stranger to
veneration of the American way of life, particularly in its patriotic manifestations.
As a clergyman member of the military institution, his very presence is seen as a
symbol of the national relationship to God.

Id
111 Berger & Pinard, Miitay Religion.- An Anaysir of the EducationalMaterialsDisseminatedby
Chaplains, in MILITARY CHAPLAINS 87-108 (H. Cox ed. 1972). The authors based their conclusions on an analysis of various prayer books, pamphlets, and periodicals published by military chaplains. They contend that military religion, and the chaplaincy which serves as its
mediating agent, function both directly and indirectly to legitimate the military enterprise.
Id at 89. Directly, military religion legitimates the military enterprise through the traditional linkage of "God and Country." In this linkage the national society, its ideology, and its
principal institutions, especially the state and military, as well as concrete policies of the latter, are explicity justified in religious terms. Id Even more importantly, military religion
indirecty legitimates the military enterprise by promulgating the image of the "wholesome
soldier," thus advocating values that are functional to soldierly performance and de-emphasizing values that are potentially disfunctional. Id at 99.
The research methods used to obtain these conclusions have been criticized. See R.
HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 130 n.7. Hutcheson admits that many chaplains would agree
without hesitation that they provide strength for "service to God and country" but claims
that most would deny that such teachings are central to their gospel. Id at 130.
A 1971 study concluded that the relationship between civil religion and church-oriented
religion contributes to role conflict among chaplains. See L. Ahrnsbrak, Role Conflicts
Among Navy Chaplains in Light of American Civil Religion (May 21, 1971) (Research Paper, Princton Theological Seminary), (discussedin R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 136-39).
112 R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 133. Among the occasions on which chaplains are
called to offer prayers are change of command ceremonies, ship commissionings, unit anniversaries, and training course graduations. Id Military ceremony is also often combined with
religious rites at memorial services and military funerals. Id. at 133-34.
113 R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 135. Such programs are never regarded by the military command as part of the explicitly "religious" program in which the chaplain represents
his church, although the chaplain generally regards his participation as part of his explicitly
religious ministry. The goals of these programs include the teaching of ethical conduct, the
facilitation of personal growth, training in human relations, assistance with human problems,
or the elimination of injustice and discrimination. Id They are official programs, and participation is usually mandatory; yet elements of common denominator religion are almost always present in them. Id Furthermore, as Pinard and Berger point out, such programs may
indirectly legitimize the activities of military enterprise. Pinard & Berger, supra note 111, at
114. For a detailed description of the various "Character Education" and "Personal Growth
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sible to justify those activities on the basis of providing access to religion for military personnel, and the implications are strong that the
government is actually using these activities to promote and enforce
14
its own religious viewpoint.' i
Another constitutional problem is presented by the evangeli1
cal "- aspect of a chaplain's ministry. It has been alleged that the
chaplaincy is designed to inculcate religious values, and thus prot6
vides encouragement for religious activity among the troops."
Many chaplains openly admit that they feel one of the chief benefits
of the chaplaincy system is that it is an office which offers countless
opportunities to present the gospel to young men, many of whom are
totally unacquainted with it.' ' 7 One expert on the chaplaincy feels
that one of the chief benefits of shared insider status is ready made
contact with the unchurched, and goes on to state that "[t]here is
probably no ministry of the church that offers a better or more natural opportunity for meaningful encounter with the functionally nonChristian majority of the population."" 8 By requiring the chaplain
to engage in a wide variety of activities beyond merely ministering to
members of his own denomination, the government arguably aids
the denominations in spreading their own faith." 9
A related problem, also stemming from the chaplain's evangelical ministry, is that of favoritism. 20 For many denominations, the
making of converts is a central thrust, and statistics show that the
and Human Relations" programs, see R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 146-80. Such programs have become increasingly uncommon in recent years, and many have been officially
terminated.
114 See Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), which held that it is no part of the business of
government to compose official prayers for recital in public schools. Id at 425. Explaining
the Court's decision, Justice White wrote of the framers:
These people knew, some of them from bitter personal experience, that one of the
greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in his own way lay in
the Government's placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of
prayer or one particular form of religious services.
Id. at 429. Given the attitude of chaplains and the content of the educational materials (see
note 11 supra), it seems difficult to discount this reasoning simply by labelling programs as
"command" rather than "religious" in nature.
115 "Evangelical" ministry, as used here, is one that concerns itself with the spreading of
the denomination's faith.
116 Plaintiffs Complaint at 6, para. 10, Katcoff v. Alexander, No. 79 Civ. 2986 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 21, 1980) (available Oct. 1, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
117 Ledebuhr, ,Mi/'ag Chaplainy." An Apologia, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Nov. 2, 1966, at
1332.
118 R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 49.
119 For examples of how much religion can be taught under the guise of a military command function, see id. at 145-61.
120 One of the chief reasons Madison opposed the chaplaincy was the danger of favorit-
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chaplain's ministry is not merely one of maintenance alone, but that
conversions are quite frequent. 121 The problem is that for every denomination that gains a convert, another loses a member. Critics
have alleged that, because clergy whose denominations do not have
endorsing agencies recognized by the Armed Forces Chaplains Board
are effectively excluded from the chaplaincy, the system favors certain religions over others. 122 This argument gains strength in light of
the extremely broad meaning ascribed by the Supreme Court to the
spirituterm "religion", 123 and the emergence of non-conventional,
24
ally-oriented movements among the troops.'
Other indications of favoritism may exist in the present chaplaincy program. The plaintiffs in Katcoff alleged that religion is favored over non-religion because chapels and other religious facilities
may be used only for religious and allied purposes.' 25 They also alleged that by granting scheduling priorities to general Protestant
services over Protestant denominational services the government favors one Protestant rite over others.' 26 Indeed, it could even be argued that the statute's requirement that chaplains perform religious
services on Sundays whenever possible 127 favors religions who have
ism. He felt the chaplaincy was an unnecessary politicizing of religion, and would exclude
religious minorities. Fleet, Madison's DetachedMemoranda, III WM. & MARY Q. 558 (1946).
121 R, HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 125-26. Hutcheson recognizes that this might lead
to problems but believes it is less likely to be a problem in practice than in theory. Id
122 Plaintiff's Complaint at 7, para. 13, Katcoffv. Alexander, No. 79 Civ. 2986 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 21, 1980) (available Oct. 1, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file). See note 50
supra.

123 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the Amish
lifestyle, educational practices, and refusal to submit their children to further secular education were religious, and not merely a personal or philosophical rejection of secular values.
Central to this determination were the following facts: (1) this was a shared belief by an
organized group rather than a personal preference; (2) the belief related to certain theocratic
principles and interpretation of religious literature; (3) the system of beliefs pervaded and
regulated their daily lives; and (4) the system of belief and lifestyle resulting therefrom had
been in existence for a substantial period of time. Id. at 215-17.
124 See R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 93. Another interesting question is presented by
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), which held that belief in God could not be a condition of employment. Does making entry into the chaplaincy dependent upon denominational
endorsement indirectly make employment as a chaplain dependant on belief in God? If so,
the chaplaincy is, arguably, inherently unconstitutional.
125 Plaintiff's Complaint at 7, para. 11, Katcoff v. Alexander, No. 79 Civ. 2986 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 21, 1980) (available Oct. 1, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
126 Id at 7, para. 12. It should be noted, however, that since there are no actual "general
Protestant services," the validity of this assertion is questionable. See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
127 10 U.S.C. § 3547 (1983) (Army); 10 U.S.C. § 6031 (1983) (Navy); 10 U.S.C. § 8547
(1983) (Air Force). See note 57 supra.
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traditionally held services on Sundays over those who have not. 28
The primary effect test prohibits not only those statutes whose
primary effect is to aid religion, but also those which effectively inhibit it as well. 29 The plaintiffs in Kalcof alleged that rather than
enhancing the right of military personnel to the free exercise of their
religion, the chaplaincy program instead serves to inhibit that free
exercise.13 Perhaps the most convincing argument in support of this
allegation is that, because the chaplain is subject to the authority of
his commanding officer, the military has the ability to restrict the
free exercise rights of the chaplain by placing requirements and/or
restrictions on the time, place, or manner of worship.' l3 Every chaplain serves under a military commander, and in theory, the authority
of that secular commander over his religious ministry can be nearly
absolute.' 3 2 While it may be true that in practice a commander
would be unlikely to influence the purely religious activity of a chap128 It is true, of course, that in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the so-called "blue laws" against allegations that the laws'
mandating of businesses closing on Sundays favored Christian religions over non-Christian
religions. However, the Court in that case based its decision on the right of the legislature to
declare that a day of rest was desirable for the public good, and that Sunday, as the traditional day of rest, was an unobjectionable choice for this purpose. Id. at 426.
The Sunday-closing laws in AfcGowan were upheld because since they did not threaten to
impose religious activity; the secular purpose and effect outweighed any incidental benefit to
those who chose to attend services on Sundays. The same cannot be said of 10 U.S.C.
§§ 3547, 6031, and 8547, which actually mandate when religious services are to be performed.
129 See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
130 Plaintiff's Complaint at 8, para. 24, Katcoff v. Alexander, No. 79 Civ. 2986 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 21, 1980) (available Oct., 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file). In regard to the
level of proof required in a free exercise case, the Supreme Court has stated that one must
"show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his
religion." School Dist. ofAbington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 202, 223 (1963). ChiefJudge
Bazelon thought that this burden was met in the case of mandatory attendance at military
academy chapels. Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denied, 409 U.S. 1076
(1972).
131 The Katcoff complaint lists a number of ways in which free exercise of religion is
inhibited by the fact that "the commander, not the chaplain or his church, has the ultimate
responsibility for the religious programs of the Army." Plaintiff's Complaint at 10, para. 31,
Katcoff v. Alexander, No. 79 Civ. 2986 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1980) (available Oct. 1, 1983, on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file). The complaint alleges that the commander has control
over: (a) determining the requirements, priorities, and geographical allocations of chaplains
and chaplain assistants; (b) determining the requirements for religious facilities and supplies;
(c) determining the allocation of funds for religious activities; (d) religious fund raising, including the flow of private, outside funds to support religious activities of the Army; and
(e) access by civilian clergy to the military community. Id. at 10, para. 31.
132 See R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 56. In fact, Hutcheson even admits that, in an
official sense, the commanding officer causes divine services to be held. Id at 59. He believes,
however, that in practice "the commander is unlikely to interfere in what is recognized as the
province of the church." Id.
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lain, it is significant that at least one major denomination (the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod) has refused to participate in the
chaplaincy on the grounds that its ministers "would not be free to
obey the direction of Christ its Head alone."' 133 The events of the
Vietnam War, and the subsequent pacifist movement, have probably
increased the possibility of conflict between chaplain and commanding officer over the content of his ministry. In addition, since promotional decisions are based, in part, upon the commanding officer's
evaluation of the chaplain's performance, 134 the pressure on the
chaplain to conform his ministry to the expectations of the military
135
command are increased.
The Kalcoff plaintiffs also alleged that by prescribing the time,
place, or manner of religious activities, the government infringes on
the free exercise rights of military personnel. Among the practices
cited in support of this allegation are: (1) the requirement of a uniform curriculum; (2) the requirement that chaplains provide general
Protestant service; (3) restrictions on the type of literature that may
be distributed by chaplains; (4) the limitations on the chaplaincy to
members of the Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish faiths; (5) educational requirements for chaplain appointments; and (6) denominational quotas for chaplains that are based on the national population
13 6
as a whole rather than the composition of the military alone.
Challenges alleging violations of the free exercise rights of chap133 Herrmann, supra note 8, at 33. Cox asks: "How does a chaplain proclaim a prophetic
gospel when he is wearing the uniform of the military, is paid by the state, and furthermore is
dependant on his superior officers for advancement?" Cox, Introduction: The Man of Godand the
Man of War, in MILITARY CHAPLAINS x (H. Cox ed. 1972).
An embittered Jewish chaplain expressed the same idea even more forcibly: "By thoroughly domesticating the military chaplain, the military makes sure that the one person who
might appeal to a higher authority (outside of channels), which might command the ultimate
loyalty of some of those within the military is effectively silenced." Siegal, Being a Chaplainin
Today'r Military, in MILITARY CHAPLAINS 109-10 (H. Cox ed. 1972).
134 See R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 192; Herrmann, supra note 8, at 30.
135 Hutcheson states that the danger of a chaplain becoming subservient to military command is not as great as opponents claim, and reports that chaplains are not nearly so much at
the mercy of commanding officers as outsiders think. R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 19294. However, the Supreme Court's position seems to be that where free exercise rights are

concerned, actual inhibition need not be shown - the potential for inhibition of first amendment freedoms may suffice. Justice Brennan, concurring in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971), noted that one teacher had stopped praying in class because the state statute
made him promise not to inject religious teaching into the secular courses. Brennan found
this to be a "concrete testimonial to the self-censorship that inevitably accompanies state
regulation of delicate First Amendment freedoms." Lemon at 650.

136 See Katcoffv. Alexander, No. 79 Civ. 2986 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1980) (available Oct. 1,
1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[1983]

lains and military personnel are, however, unlikely to be successful.
The right to free exercise of religion in the military situation is probably not absolute, but must be tempered by the realities of military
life.' 37 In addition, the Supreme Court seems to distinguish between
religious "status" and religious "belief." In McDaniel v. Pay,'38 McDaniel, a prospective candidate and a minister, challenged a Tennessee statute which prohibited ministers from holding a seat in the state
legislature. The Court ruled the statute invalid; however, Chief Justice Burger was careful to point out that since the statute operated
against McDaniel because of his "status" as a minister or priest, and
since ministerial status was defined in terms of conduct and activity
rather than in terms of belief, the free exercise clause's absolute prohibition of infringements on the freedom to believe was "inapposite." 39 But three justices saw no real distinction between status and
belief, and the question cannot be regarded as settled.140
3.

The Excessive Entanglement Test

Any conceivable form of providing religion to military personnel
is likely to entail the danger of significant governmental entanglement with religion. The Supreme Court's decision in Walz v. Commissioner' 4 l suggests that analysis of the varying degrees of entanglement
engendered by possible alternative systems is an important consideration in determining whether the present program suffers from excessive entanglement with religion.' 42 Thus, judicial consideration of
the constitutionality of the chaplaincy may very well consist of a
weighing of the present system's potential for entanglement with that
of alternative systems of supplying religion, such as a privately
43
funded civilian chaplaincy.
Supporters of the chaplaincy point to an impressive record of
harmonious relations between the armed forces, churches, and government. 44 Yet it is undeniable that the military chaplaincy, because of its inherent institutional duality, is fraught with potentially
137 See note 163 infra and accompanying text.
138 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
139 Id. at 627 (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
140 See id. at 632 (Brennan, J., concurring), 642-643 (Stewart, J., concurring), 643 (White,
J., concurring).
141 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
142 See notes 178-99supra and accompanying text.
143 See notes 180-87 supra and accompanying text.
144 Hutcheson claims that the pluralism which characterizes the chaplaincy is a "notable
achievement" in that it is a "workable triparte relationship" between armed forces, churches,
and a religiously neutral government. R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 109.
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entangling areas. A few potentially troubling areas have already
been encountered. One is the problem of primary jurisdiction. In
1972 the Navy sought to court-martial a chaplain under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice for committing adultery with the wives of
servicemen who had been sent away for duty. 4 5 But the American
Baptist Convention argued that the chaplain had wronged the denomination, not the military, and demanded that the church be
given jurisdiction to discipline him in its own ecclesiastical courts.
The church even went so far as to attempt to enlist the aid of the
other denominations in opposing the military. 146 The controversy
waned when the chaplain was acquitted,, but the spectre of similar
confrontations in the future remains.
Another potentially entangling situation already encountered
involves the government's activity in such substantive matters of religion as the wording of educational materials. In 1968, the American
Civil Liberties Union created quite a controversy by successfully arguing for the deletion of references to God and religion from the
Army's character-guidance program manual.1 47 Following great
public uproar, the references were reinserted and the controversy
ended. Still, the potential for entanglement and political divisiveness
was made clear. A third potentially entangling situation was encountered during World War II when the Navy announced its U- 12 program, which gave financial support to theological trainees who later
145 United States v. Jensen (court-martial tried at the Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, Florida in 1972). See Ripple,supra note 9, at 1236; NEWSWEEK, Mar. 27, 1972, at 99; R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 29.
146 R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 124. For a more complete account of the widelypublicized trial, see A. JENSEN & M. ABRAMSON, THE TRIAL OF CHAPLAIN JENSEN (1974).
147 See Willoughby, Chaplains Role Under New Scrutiny, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Apr. 25,
1969, at 32-33. To appreciate the potential for entanglement, and especially for political
divisiveness, the events should be recounted in some detail.
According to Willoughby, when several Congressmen discovered the deletions, there was
"righteous indignation aplenty." Newscaster Paul Harvey fanned the flame, and soon
"whats-this-country-coming-to letters" were piling up on Congressmen's desks. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird claimed any Army orders for chaplains to stop referring to God were
"news to him." He called for an immediate departmental review, and within the week, "God
was redrafted." Id
Dr. Ray Appelquist (of the General Commission on Chaplains and Armed Forces Personnel) said:
"We could have told them they were facing a hopeless task. Taking God out of
morals is like teaching mathematics without a timetable. There's often a lot of
unnecessary flack coming from the Pentagon on religious questions. We could have
saved them a lot of trouble if they'd only let us in on it.
Id Appelquist thought a simple solution would be to form a permanent advisory body to
inform the military of what the probable feeling of the churches on touchy religious questions
would be.
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would become Navy chaplains. Certain churchmen saw it as an attempt by the Navy to control the education of ministers, and a rous1 48
ing dispute arose.
Based on these experiences, a wide variety of potentially entangling situations can be envisioned. For example, the chaplain's officer status 149 could involve the military and the churches in conflict.
As a matter of course, when a denomination has stripped a chaplain
of his ecclesiastical endorsement, the army has voluntarily released
him from the ranks, 50 though it is not required by law to do so.15 '
Even though the process is usually accomplished without difficulty,1 52 the potential for conflict is immediately perceivable.
The converse situation, involuntary release, presents a similar
danger. When a chaplain is inadequately performing his duties, the
combined pressure of church and military is generally brought to effect his involuntary release. 53 This cooperation could be entangling
in itself. Furthermore, the military could theoretically release a
chaplain even against the wishes of his denomination. 54 And, although there are safeguards against such discharges, 55 it is not inconceivable that the chaplain or his denomination could conclude
that the release was motivated by the chaplain's preaching of views
unpopular to the military establishment. Again, the potential for
conflict is obvious.
The potential for such occurances is compounded by the
churches' desire to become increasingly involved in the chaplaincy
by assuming more control and responsibility over the program. In
the interests of creating a more effective chaplaincy that will be more
responsive to the needs of the people it serves, chaplains 56 and de148 See Kug, supra note 67, at 88-89. No branch of the armed forces presently gives
financial assistance to prospective military chaplains.
149 See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
150

See R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 18.

151 Id
152 See R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 27. However, Hutcheson notes that in one instance in the late sixties a regular Navy chaplain whose endorsement had been withdrawn by
his denomination refused to resign. The permanence of his commission, in the absence of
officially documented unsatisfactory performance, was protected by law. A compromise was
reached under which the chaplain was allowed to remain in the Navy but was assigned nonchaplain duties. Id
153 Id at 27.
154 No such situation has yet occurred.
.155 For example, chaplain evaluations are to be based on performance of religious duties
alone. See note 52 supra.
156 See R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 29, 197-214.
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nominations 57 have called for increased church supervision and control of the chaplaincy. Many chaplains and denominations urge
stronger church supervision and support structures, 58 and recommend that multi-denominational organizations, such as the General
Commission, be strengthened to provide a united voice to coordinate
military policy on chaplains. 5 9 While such changes would probably
lead to a more effective chaplaincy, they might also multiply the entanglements between church and state.
B. AdditionalJustifcationsfor the Militay Chaplainy
The Katcof court stated its belief that even if the plaintiffs could
prove that the present chaplaincy program was not perfectly tailored
to meet the goal of providing otherwise unavailable religious facilities
to military personnel, they would not necessarily, by that determination alone, establish the program's invalidity. 60 The court felt that
it would also have to consider any additional justification put forth
by the defendants to establish the present posture of the chaplaincy
program. Two additional justifications can be advanced, the first
based on national defense, and the second on the chaplaincy's long
history of acceptance as a part of American life.
1. "National Defense" Justification
Some commentators argue that the chaplaincy is necessary to
the defense of the nation, and therefore not subject to the usual establishment clause analysis. As one author stated, "[i]f.

.

. use of

government paid chaplains is determined to be necessary for the defense of the nation, the Establishment Clause will not stand in the
way."' 6 ' In other words, even if chaplains in normal circumstances
would be unconstitutional, war and preparation for war are not ordinary circumstances.1 62 Such arguments have, in the past, successfully
157 Id at 30-32.
158 Id at 202-205.
159 Id at 202. See also Appelquist's proposal for a "permanent advisory body," supra note
147.
160 Katcoff v. Alexander, No. 79 Civ. 2986 (E.D.N.Y Aug. 21, 1980) (available Oct. 1,
1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
161 L. PHEFFER, GOD, CAESAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 160-61 (1975). A similar argument was made and rejected regarding compulsory attendance at chapel for cadets in Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
162 Appelquist uses this justification to conclude that the chaplaincy is within Congress'
power under the "War Powers Clause." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. See Appelquist, Introduction:
Chaplainy Rationale and Support, in CHURCH STATE AND CHAPLAINCY 6-7 (A.R. Appelquist
ed. 1969).
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defended government infringements of first amendment freedoms.
Speech, for instance, can be restricted in time of war to an extent not
possible in times of peace. 16 3 It seems unlikely that this justification
alone could support the chaplaincy. But the unique situation
presented by the military is at least another factor which could be
1 64
relied on by a court to uphold the present chaplaincy.
2.

Historical Justification

Certainly there is no such thing as constitutionality by prescription. The mere fact that the military chaplaincy has gone unchallenged for over two hundred years cannot be automatically
interpreted as an implied validation by the Supreme Court of its constitutionality. 65 This historical tradition of acceptance, however, is
far from irrelevant, and the Marsh decision suggests that it may even
be the determining factor in finding the program constitutional.
Even prior to Marsh, historical practice has been an important
factor in establishment clause analysis. 6 6 Indeed, historical practice
may have been the determinitive factor in Walz v. Commissioner. 167 In
that case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of tax exemptions for religious places of worship. Noting that the practice
was "deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life,'

68

the

Court went on to state that long use and unbroken practice is "not
something to be lightly cast aside."' 169 Justice Brennan, concurring,
was even more explicit, stating that "the more longstanding and
widely accepted a practice, the greater its impact on constitutional
interpretation."

70

163 L. PHEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 251-52 (1967). See, e.g., Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Cortright v. Resor,
447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971); Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir. 1969).
164 The Katcoff court was careful to note that a determination of the validity of plaintiff's
claims cannot be made in a vacuum, and that additional justifications presented by defendants for the present posture of the chaplaincy program would be considered. Katcoff v. Alexander, No. 79 Civ. 2986 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1980) (available Oct. 1, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist. file).
165 The KatcofJcourt refused to find a "body of constitutional jurisprudence" in the statements of the Supreme Court justices, holding that the plaintiff's claims must be given "full
and fair consideration . . . [from a] fully developed factual record." Id.
166 See, e.g., Justice Stewart's dissent in Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 450 (1962) (arguing
for permitting the recitation of prayer before school commences because such prayer is one of
the nation's deeply entrenched and highly cherished spiritual traditions). See also Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 648-49 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
167 397 U.S. 664 (1970). See Ripple, supra note 9, at 1219.
168 397 U.S. at 676.
169 Id at 678.
170 Id. at 681. See Ripple, supra note 9, at 1219-1224. Justice Brennan, concurring in
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But by far the strongest support for the position that the military chaplaincy is constitutional because of its long history as a part
of American life lies in Marsh v. Chambers.1 7 1 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger began by noting that the opening of sessions
of legislatures and other deliberative public bodies with prayer "is72
deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country."'
Burger then traced in some detail the history of the adoption of the
first amendment and of legislative prayer, and concluded that "[t]his
unique history leads us to accept the interpretation of the First
Amendment draftsmen who saw no real threat to the Establishment
Clause arising from a practice of prayer similar to that now challenged."' 173 Moreover, the Court went on to state that "[i]n light of
the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there
can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with
prayer has become part of the fabric of our society."' 174 The Court
felt the practice was not an establishment of religion, but merely a
tolerable acknowledgement of the beliefs widely held among the peo175
ple of this country.
It is entirely possible that the Court, in looking at the history of
the military chaplaincy in American life, might reach a similar conclusion with regard to the military chaplaincy. Several factors, however, distinguish the situation of the military chaplain from that of
the legislative chaplain. First, the history of the American people's
acceptance of the military chaplain is not "long and unbroken." In
fact, as has been discussed, the relationship has often been one
fraught with criticism, especially during the Vietnam War. 76 Second, in Marsh the Court seems to place the ultimate justification for
its decision on the belief that legislative chaplaincies pose "no real
threat"' 77 to the establishment clause. And, in fact, legislative chaplaincies do affect a relatively small number of people and consume a
School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 234 (1963), wrote that "an awareness of history and an appreciation of the aims of the Founding Fathers does not always
resolve concrete problems." This idea was echoed in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977),
where Justice Powell stated that "[a]t this point in the 20th Century we are quite far removed
from the dangers that prompted the Framers to include the Establishment Clause in the Bill
of Rights." Id at 263 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoted with
approval in Mueller v. Allen, 103 S.Ct. 3062, 3069 (1983)).
171 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983). See notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text.
172 Id at 3332-33.
173 Id at 3335.
174 Id at 3336.
175 Id
176 See notes 68-73 supra and accompanying text.
177 103 S. Ct. at 3337.
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relatively small amount of public funds. The same cannot be said of
the military chaplaincy.
V.

Alternative Systems

The present system is, at the very least, constitutionally suspect.1 78 If the Katcoff opinion is correct in that the constitutional justification for a military chaplaincy extends only so far as its existence
is reasonably necessary to insure that the free exercise rights of military personnel will not be abridged, it becomes the task of the Court
to determine which aspects of the presentchaplaincy are unnecessary
to achieve that goal. Such a determination requires an analysis of
the various alternative systems that have been proposed to supply the
religious needs of military personnel.' 79 The drawbacks inherent in
many alternative systems might be so severe that the requirements of
free exercise would be validated "in toto," despite its substantial
overbreadth.

80

A.

Demilitanzation

In the past fifteen years some denominations and other organi8
zations have called for demilitarization of the military chaplaincy.' '
The chaplaincy would not be abolished altogether, but rather a privately funded and controlled chaplains corps would be created
which, while obviously necessitating considerable government cooperation, would not be a formal part of the military organization.
The demilitarization alternative presents a number of
problems. While a privately-funded civilian chaplaincy has been
suggested in a number of studies, none of the studies have presented
concrete suggestions on how such a system might be implemented.
Moreover, there has never been a thorough, in-depth study of possi82
ble demilitarized chaplaincies and their effectiveness.1
178 Katcoff v. Alexander, No. 79 Civ. 2986 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1980) (available Oct. 1,
1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
179 It has, of course, been suggested that the military chaplaincy as such be abolished
altogether. See Miller, Chaplaincy vs. Mission in a Secular Age, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Nov. 2,
1966, at 1335-37, (arguing from a purely theological point of view). However, these proposals
fail to consider the free exercise rights of soldiers, and so are not discussed here.
180 The United Presbyterian Task Force, after examining the various alternatives, was
unable to find any that did not "suffer by comparison to the present arrangement." United
PresbyterianReport, supra note 38, at 41.
181

See R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 30-31.

182 In 1972, however, the General Commission did publish a feasibility study of civilian
chaplaincy for the armed forces. Armed Forces Chaplains: All Civilians?, 29 THE CHAPLAIN 1-86
(1972). See R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 186.
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On the other hand, a great deal of evidence suggests that the
Army's status as a total institution I8 3 makes it necessary that the
chaplain share insider status 8 4 with the troops. Many chaplains regard their insider status as an imperative,8 5 and feel that any attempt to remove the chaplaincy from formal association with the
military will fail miserably. 186 While this claim has been disputed,
there can be no doubt that deprivation of shared insider status would
cause at least some reduction in a chaplain's ability to effectively
minister to military personnel. 8 7 The court must then wrestle with
the question of whether such an emasculated chaplaincy is sufficient
to satisfy free exercise requirements. Nor would the inquiry stop
there. Even if a civilian chaplaincy were deemed adequate, strong
counterveiling considerations of military exingency may require that
all persons accompanying the armed forces in a support capacity be
subject to the military chain of command and to the sanctions of
military discipline. 188
B.

Changes Within the Militay

Most suggestions for change in the chaplain's status within the
military concern questions of rank and uniform.' 89 As early as 1938
commentators suggested that chaplains lay aside uniform and
183 The concept of a total institution was developed by Erving Goffman in Goffman, On
the Characten'sticsof Total Institutions, in E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMs 3-124 (1961). Major characteristics of a total institution are: (1) an encompassing tendency; (2) a breakdown of barriers;
and (3) needs which are handled by the bureaucracy. The military is a classic example of the
"total institution," although there are indications that the recent liberalization of the armed
forces may affect this status. See R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 35-53.
184 "Insider status" refers to the chaplain's position as a member of the military institution, as opposed to a civilian participant.
185 R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 188.
186 Id The National Study Conference on Church and State concluded that a privately
supported chaplaincy presented almost insuperable difficulties. Appelquist, supra note 38, at
22.
187 See Herrmann, supra note 8, at 30-31. Not all commentators feel this reduced effectiveness is necessarily negative. Miller, after proposing that the chaplaincy make a radical break
from the state, writes: "Let them hope for nothing more than tolerance from the government.
It may be good sometimes if they are unwelcome; we should be suspicious when there is no
healthy tension between state and church." Miller, supra note 179, at 1337.
188 Ripple, supra note 9, at 1236. Ripple notes that 10 U.S.C. § 802 (1983) demonstrates a
congressional determination to subject the broadest category of persons connected with the
armed forces to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. But see McElroy v. Guagliargo, 361
U.S. 281, 283-84 (1960); Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 235, 236-40 (1960); Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 19-41 (1957); Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22-23 (1955).
189 For a good proposal of such a system, see Brown, Militay Chaplainy as Ministy, in
MILITARY CHAPLAINS 139, 146 (H. Cox. ed. 1972).
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rank.'1° A possible alternative system avoiding uniform and rank is
that employed by the British navy, in which chaplains hold no rank
but theoretically assume the rank of whomever they are speaking
to.' 9 ' The approach of American Red Cross presents another possibility; their personnel are uniformed, but not as military officers.192
Officer status, however, may be necessary to enable the chaplain to
perform his duties, and loss of this status could drastically reduce his
effectiveness.19 3 Again, the Court must then decide whether a chaplaincy with such diminished effectiveness is sufficient to meet the demands of the free exercise clause.
Other changes within the military, even less drastic, might
render the system sufficiently narrow to pass constitutional muster.
Specifically, one author has proposed that all day-to-day activities of
the chaplain that do not specifically relate to the ministerial duties
mandated by the free exercise clause be eliminated. 194 Alternatively,
the chaplaincy could seek a more independent organizational power
base. One suggestion is to reduce the chaplain's dependency on the
military by increasing the status and power of the Chief of Chaplains
over various matters connected with chaplain activities. 95 For example, primary fiscal control over the religious programs, presently
the responsibility of the commanding officer, could be assumed by
190 See The Chaplaincy Question, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Dec. 21, 1938, at 1567-68. See also
Herrmann, supra note 8, at 30.
191 See C. ABERCOMBIE. supra note 9, at 141-42.
192 The American Red Cross has a corps of career field directors who serve the armed
forces under a legal agreement. They are extended many courtesies by the military, such as
office space on bases and use of government communications facilities, but they are not actually a part of the military. See R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 187.
193 Id. at 198.
194 See Klitgaard, supra note 72, at 1379, in which the author suggests that the chaplain
should continue to work within the system but refuse to assume the position of a "military
lackey." Essentially, if this course of action were adopted, the chaplain would retain the
powers of his rank but would be "relieved of those aspects which hamper his Christian mission." Id. Thus, the chaplain's duties at certain ceremonial occasions and his involvement in
personnel development programs might cease.
On the other hand, Williams states at least four reasons why difficultly exists in distinguishing between church and state functions in the chaplaincy. First, the principle of separation of church and state has been operative in the American republic for considerably less
than half of the history of American society. Second, the religious pluralism of the original
republic and the religious fervor connected with almost all American wars has created a civil
or common denominator religion. Third, the roles of the chaplain have never been defined
by statute and directive and have extended over a considerable range. Fourth, the chaplaincy is more peculiarly American than most professional historians of the chaplaincy in the
army and navy have recognized. See Williams, supra note 59, at 13-15.
195 R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 66.
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the Chief of Chaplains. 96 Additionally, the promotional process
could be redesigned with a view toward decreasing the influence of
the commanding officer.All these suggestions, however, while tending to reduce the dependency of the chaplaincy on the military, might inevitably lead to
greater entanglement than now exists. The less the churches are concerned about the chaplaincy, the less chance there is for conflict, and
fewer situations will be encountered which require close church-state
administrative cooperation. If the above suggestions were implemented, the entanglements between church and state could become
much more pronounced. For instance, who would monitor the chaplains to make sure they were not engaging in activities that went beyond their ministerial function? Who would make major policy
decisions regarding the day-to-day activities of chaplains? If the
chaplains corps were treated as an ancillary force, like the Red Cross,
who would supervise the program to ensure that the requisite cooperation was being advanced by both sides? Acceptable solutions to all
these problems might be found, but surely such issues must be taken
into account by any court assessing the constitutionality of the pres97
ent program. 1
C. Maintenance of the Military Chaplainy Ono Where
Civilian Ministy Is Not Possible
The concurring opinions of Justices Brennan and Goldberg in
Abington imply that the government need not supply chaplains and
chapels where civilian facilities are available to the military personnel.' 98 Thus, at isolated locations the government would supply
chaplains and religious services, but on stateside bases military personnel would make use of civilian churches and facilities. At least
one scholar thinks the proposal may provide a tentative solution. 9 9
Like the other alternatives, however, this proposal has its drawbacks. It may be desirable, perhaps even necessary, to keep chaplains
196 Id at 68.
197 In preparation for such scrutiny, it has been suggested that the military should give
increased attention to known "stress points" between the churches and the military. Ripple
states that such a demonstration of careful forethought may be at least partially effective in
keeping the Court's entanglement analysis within meaningful bounds. Ripple, supra note 9.
at 1237. Abercrombie agrees, stating: "[F]orewarned of the storm that may someday break,
churchmen should think out clearly what a chaplain should be if he is to render greatest
service to the army and the nation while remaining faithful to the shepard and his sheep." C.
ABERCROMBIE, supra note 9, at 137.
198 Ste notes 29-30 supra. See also Hermann, supra note 8, at 34.
199 Hermann, supra note 8, at 34.
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at stateside bases.2 00 Moreover, it is difficult to imagine what criteria
would be employed to determine when adequate civilian facilities are
available, and when they are not. The plan, while attractive in the
abstract, may prove difficult in execution.
VI.

Conclusion

The statutes authorizing the military chaplaincy programs in
the various branches of the armed forces of the United States, and
the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, are on their face
and as applied overly broad, and many aspects of the present military chaplaincy cannot be justified by free exercise clause requirements. Yet this conclusion only establishes that the program is
constitutionally suspect; it does not necessarily follow that the program would or should be declared unconstitutional. Clearly, some
form of military chaplaincy is mandated by the free exercise clause,
and the present system has functioned admirably in meeting this
need. While alternative systems initially seem less objectionable to
the establishment clause, they may in fact require more, not less, entanglement with religion. Moreover, whether these alternatives
would be sufficiently effective to satisfy the requirements of the free
exercise clause is unclear. A decision by a court overturning the
chaplaincy would involve the court in a long, difficult process of assessing the effectiveness of untried and untested alternatives and supervising their implementation and operation. Finally, the
program's long history of acceptance cannot be ignored.
In view of any court's natural reluctance to engage in such an
undertaking, a court could well rely on the unique circumstances surrounding the military chaplaincy to justify a maintenance of the
present institution. For, in the final analysis, a court is likely to find
that although the program is overbroad, the special nature of the
military situation makes the elimination of this overbreadth
impossible.
Moreover, the Supreme Court, in Marsh, has provided itself with
an effective way to escape making even this determination. Surely
the prospect of validating the military chaplaincy by a finding that it
also is a part of the "fabric of our society" would be attractive to the
Court. But whether the military chaplaincy is susceptible to such
200 Hutcheson lists five reasons for maintaining chaplains at stateside bases: (I) readiness;
(2) counseling; (3) mobility; (4) effect on ecclesiastical life; and (5) health of the chaplain.
R. HUTCHESON, supra note 45, at 198-200.
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treatment is questionable, and the Court may find that it is ultimately unable to apply the Marsh analysis to the military chaplaincy.
William T Cavanaugh,Jr.

